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NOTE-STATE RICO
INTRODUCTION
In the twenty-five years since Congress passed the Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in 1970,1 twenty-
nine states, as well as Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, have enacted
similar legislation, called "Baby RICO" statutes by many commenta-
tors.2 Most, though not all, of these state statutes make it a crime for a
person to conduct or participate in an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity.3 Some legal analysts describe the "enterprise"
element as that "entity to, from or through which the activities pro-
scribed by RICO operate."4 None of the state RICO statutes defines
enterprise precisely the same way as the federal RICO statute,5
although most states model their definitions of enterprise on the fed-
eral statute with only minor changes.
Several legal commentators have recently argued that the federal
and some state definitions of enterprise are too broad, and should be
narrowed in order to restrict prosecution only to the most well-devel-
oped criminal syndicates of organized crime.6 This Note will focus
exclusively on criminal applications of state RICO statutes and argue
that state legislatures should not narrow the state enterprise require-
ments. Rather, state courts should interpret the enterprise require-
ments broadly in order to cover the relatively small criminal
1 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968 (1994)).
2 See, e.g., Steven L. Kessler, And a Little Child Shall Lead Them: New York's Organized
Crime Control Act of 1986, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 797, 798 (1990) (referring to New York's
Organized Crime Control Act as "Baby RICO" or "Little RICO"). But see Michael P. Kenny
& H. Suzanne Smith, A Comprehensive Analysis of Georgia RICO, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 537, 538
n.9 (arguing that the term "Baby RICO" "is misleading, inasmuch as it suggests that [Geor-
gia's RICO Statute] is merely a state analog of federal RICO").
S See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 166.720(3) (1993). But seeN.Y. PENAL LAW§ 460.20(1)(c)
(McKinney 1989) (criminalizing participation in "a pattern of criminal activity").
4 Robert L Gegios & Deborah M. Jervis, RICO & WOCCA, Wis. LAw., Apr. 1990, at
18, 20.
5 The federal RICO statute defines enterprise at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) as follows:
"'[E]nterprise 'includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other
legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity."
6 See, e.g., Russell D. Leblang, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion Under State RICO, 24
SuFFoLK U. L Ray. 79 (1990) (suggesting multiple procedural and definitional amend-
ments); Jennifer Daley, Note, Tightening the Net of Florida's RICO Act, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. Ray.
381 (1993) (arguing in favor of amending "enterprise" to include a continuity
requirement).
As this Note will demonstrate, critics of both state and federal RICO are not difficult
to find. One commentator expressed mild surprise at this fact, noting that only
"[o]ccasionally, an article or editorial will defend RICO, an event which occurs less often
than one would expect in light of the fact that tfie statute has produced the federal govern-
ment's most spectacular successes against organized crime." Paul E. Coffey, The Selection,
Analysis, and Approval of Federal RICO Prosecutions, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1036
(1990).
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organizations and white-collar crime that state legislatures intended to
reach by passing state RICO statutes in the first place. Although some
state courts have already narrowed the definition of enterprise, such
interpretations run counter to recent precedent from the United
States Supreme Court.7 A more appropriate restriction of RICO
would focus on the "pattern of racketeering activity" element, requir-
ing prosecutors to prove that the defendant participated in a pattern
of specific criminal activity during an association with the enterprise.
If, however, state RICO statutes should be restricted at all, it is the
legislature, not the courts, that should amend the "pattern of racke-
teering activity" element to narrow the list of crimes that can count as
predicate acts.8
In Part I, this Note describes the background of the federal RICO
statute, the development in the late 1970s and 1980s of state RICO
statutes, and the scope of prosecutorial use of state RICO statutes.9
There are good reasons why many states have adopted their own
RICO statutes, including the familiarity of state prosecutors with local
problems of small-scale criminal associations and the ability to en-
hance the tools of prosecution for those criminals that the federal
RICO statute does not reach.10
Part II of this Note discusses the efficacy of state RICO statutes,
describes the general approach state courts take to interpreting the
enterprise element when there is little state court precedent, and ana-
lyzes and compares state formulations of the "enterprise" element in a
definitional context, including those states that concentrate on a par-
ticular form of criminal activity like "street gangs."
7 See, e.g., National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994) (striking
down the "economic motive" requirement established by lower federal courts).
8 Among the crimes that various state RICO statutes count as predicate acts are the
following: homicide, assault, robbery, kidnapping, forgery, counterfeiting, theft, embezzle-
ment, illegal kickbacks, election offenses, wrongful influence of a public servant, official
misconduct, bribery, sports bribery, gambling, usury, loan sharking, coercion, extortion,
extortionate extensions of credit, gaming law offenses, credit card crimes, drug trafficking,
obstructingjustice, perjuryjury and witness tampering, fraud, deceptive business practices,
tax offenses, money laundering, and environmental crimes. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, STATE
CrVIL RICO PROGRAMS 11 app. A n.1 (Program Brief 1992) [hereinafter PROGRAM BRIEF].
9 It is important at this point to emphasize what this Note will not do. This Note will
not survey how federal courts have interpreted or should interpret the federal "enterprise"
element. There are several excellent articles treating this subject. See Arthur Patrick
Breshnahan et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 30 Am. CRIM. L. Rav. 847
(1993); David M. Ludwick, Note, Restricting RICO: Narrowing the Scope of Enterprise, 2 CoR-
NELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 381 (1993); Thomas S. O'Neill, Note, Functions of the RICO Enterprise
Concept, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 646 (1989).
The scope of this Note is limited to a survey of state RICO statutes, definitional com-
parison of the "enterprise" element, and case analysis from selected state court opinions
that address the interpretation of "enterprise."
10 See infra part I.B.2.
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In Part III, this Note selectively analyzes a group of state court
cases that illustrate the various approaches state courts take in defin-
ing the scope of state RICO statutes. State courts have struggled to
establish a workable doctrine for finding associations in fact.
Finally, Part IV looks to the future of state RICO statutes, re-
sponds to critics who argue for restricting both the use and scope of
state RICO statutes and their enterprise requirements and suggests
practical methods of restricting the scope of RICO without limiting
the enterprise definition.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The Federal RICO Statute
1. The Cimes and the Definition
When Congress enacted RICO in 1970, the statute was hailed as a
novel and powerful new tool, allowing prosecutors to target a broad
range of organized criminal activity." The federal RICO statute
criminalizes four activities: (1) The use or investment of income de-
rived from a pattern of racketeering activity in the acquisition, estab-
lishment, or operation of an enterprise; 12 (2) The acquisition or
maintenance of an interest in or control of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity;' 3 (3) Employment by or association
with an enterprise whose affairs are conducted by or participated in by
a defendant through a pattern of racketeering activity;14 and (4) Con-
spiracy to violate any of the first three parts. 15 In all cases, the enter-
prise must be engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. 16
11 See Gerard E. Lynch, A Conceptual, Practica and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43
VAND. L. Rrv. 769, 770-76 (1990); see also Ludwick, supra note 9, at 381 (describing federal
RICO as "a new means of attacking organized crime and sophisticated criminal
syndicates").
12 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1994).
13 Id. § 1962(b).
14 Id. § 1962(c).
15 Id. § 1962(d).
16 Id. § 1962(a)-(d). It is beyond the scope of this Note to examine and compare
which of these four offenses state RICO statutes incorporate. To be sure, there is much
variation among the states, although most states have adopted at least one of these four
offenses. The concern of this Note is definitional, and in such an analysis, it is not neces-
sary to discuss the various offenses a person can commit in association with an enterprise.
Of course, it will be necessary to discuss the states' formulations of the RICO enterprise
and compare them to the federal definition.
Further, although this Note is concerned with the criminal implications of RICO, it
should not be overlooked that in the federal RICO statute and in most state RICO statutes,
there is a civil remedy as well. Under federal RICO, a cause of action arises for "[a]ny
person injured in his business or property" by a violation of RICO, allowing recovery of
treble damages and attorney's fees. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994); see also Lynch, supra note
11, at 792-97 (discussing the purpose and scope of civil RICO). As of 1991, civil RICO
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There are several elements a prosecutor must prove in a federal
RICO case.' 7 This Note focuses primarily on the section of the federal
RICO statute that defines enterprise: "' [El nterprise' includes any in-
dividual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not
a legal entity."' 8 Some federal courts, discussed below, have grafted
structural requirements to the proof of an association in fact, and
some state courts have added these structural requirements to their
RICO statutes.' 9
cases amounted to more than 90% of all RICO actions in federal court. Look Who's Saving
RICO, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1991, at A10.
Some state RICO statutes offer more expansive forms of civil remedy, including per-
sonal injury, punitive damages, and private injunctive or other equitable relief. See Douo-
LAs E. ABRAMs, THE LAw OF CrvIL RICO § 7.1 (1991 & Supp. 1994). In all cases, the
enterprise requirement for both criminal and civil variations of state and federal RICO is
the same.
17 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
18 Id. § 1961(4).
19 Many legal commentators have argued that Congress intended only to target "or-
ganized crime" when it passed RICO in 1970. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 2, at 797 (argu-
ing that "Congress enacted... [RICO] to combat the influence of organized crime in
interstate and foreign commerce"); Robert S. Murphy, Arizona RICO, Trebl Damages, and
Punitive Damages: Which One Does Not Belong?, 22 AIuz. ST. LJ. 299 (1990) (describing fed-
eral RICO as a congressional response "to an increase in organized crime"); Ludwick, supra
note 9, at 420 (calling the "true target" of RICO "organized crime").
However, the chief author of the federal RICO statute has argued that "the most pow-
erful myth ... is that RICO was designed to deal only with organized crime." G. Robert
Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the
Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God-Is This the End of RCO?", 43 VAon. L. Rrv. 851,
860 (1990). It is true that federal RICO was designed to deal with organized crime, but the
originator of the federal RICO statute has called that a "half truth." Id. at 866. RICO was
intended to deal with all forms of "enterprise criminality," including white-collar crime. 1d.
For a detailed analysis of the history of the federal RICO statute, see Lynch, supra note
11. As Lynch pointed out:
Congress extensively revised RICO in 1984 and did nothing whatever to cut
back on the statute as it had been interpreted in the courts. Instead, it
broadened the law in a number of crucial respects, including the controver-
sial forfeiture provisions. By the 1984 revision, the use of both civil and
criminal RICO in white-collar and political corruption cases, as well as
against organized crime groups, was well established, as was the widespread
use of civil RICO. Whether or not Congress knew what it was doing in
1970, it cannot be claimed that by 1984 it was unaware of what its words had
accomplished.
Id. at 775.
The United States Supreme Court recently explained that "Congress for cogent rea-
sons chose to enact a more general statute, one which, although it had organized crime as
its focus, was not limited in application to organized crime." H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989).
One interesting state civil RICO case in which organized crime became an issue is
Larson v. Smith, 391 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). In a challenge to the plaintiffs form
of pleading, the court held that "it was not necessary that the complaint allege that defend-
ants were 'organized criminal elements.'" Id. at 687-88. The court concluded that it was
not necessary for a plaintiff to prove any "nexus" with organized crime in order to prevail.
Id. at 688.
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2. The "Pattern of Racketeering Activity" Element
Proof of a pattern of racketeering is also critical to any successful
RICO prosecution, be it state or federal. The federal RICO statute
states that "racketeering activity" consists of predicate acts: violations
of certain federal or state statutes or both.20 The "pattern of racke-
teering activity" element "requires at least two acts of racketeering ac-
tivity, one of which occurred after the effective date of [the RICO
statute] and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding
any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of
racketeering activity."21 Therefore, though a pattern must exist, the
particular predicate acts need not necessarily occur one right after the
other; they can be separated by as long as ten years.
3. The Liberal Construction Clause
The federal RICO statute contains a "liberal construction clause"
requiring that its "provisions... be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes."22 This clause has allowed federal courts to inter-
pret the statutory language and definitions broadly.2 3 Critics of fed-
eral RICO point to the construction clause as evidence that Congress
overreacted to enterprise criminality.2 4 Some state RICO statutes have
a similar liberal construction clause, allowing courts broad latitude to
effectuate state legislatures' intent and purpose.2 5 Florida, however,
enacted a strict construction clause, requiring courts to narrowly inter-
pret the state's RICO provisions and offenses in accord with the statu-
tory language.2 6
20 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994).
21 Id. § 1961(5).
22 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
947 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994)).
No other federal statute that imposes criminal penalties has a liberal construction
directive like the RICO statute. SeeJacqueline Dowd, Interpreting RTCO: In Florida, the Rules
are Different, 40 U. FLA. L. Rrv. 127, 159 n.217 (1988).
23 See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983); United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576, 587-93 (1980).
24 See, e.g., Daley, supra note 6, at 395 (noting that critics charge that the liberal con-
struction clause "rendered the rule of lenity inapplicable"). But see Craig W. Palm, Note,
RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 167, 169 (1980) (arguing that
critics "misunderstand the nature of statutory ambiguity, flout the congressional directive,
and misuse legislative history in their attempt to justify a narrow construction of RICO").
25 Examples include Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island,
and the Virgin Islands. SeeAR.Ams, supra note 16, §§ 7.4, 7.11, 7.12, 7.16, 7.23, 7.26, 7.28a.
26 See Dowd, supra note 22, at 159-63; Daley, supra note 6, at 396.
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B. The 1980s: The States Respond
1. The Development of State RICO
After the federal RICO statute became effective in 1970, states
were initially slow to enact similar racketeering laws because the im-
pact and effectiveness of the federal law was still unclear.27 The first
state to enact a RICO statute patterned after the federal statute was
Hawaii, whose law became effective in 1972.28 Hawaii was followed by
Pennsylvania in 1973, Florida in 1977, Arizona and Puerto Rico in
1978, and Rhode Island in 1979.29 The largest and most rapid growth
of state RICO statutes occurred during the 1980s, when twenty-three
states enacted RICO statutes generally patterned after the federal ver-
sion.30 The newest RICO statute was passed in 1990 by the Territory
of the Virgin Islands. 31
Because the federal RICO statute does not preempt state RICO
statutes on the subjects it addresses,3 2 other states are likely to pass
versions of RICO in the not-too-distant future.33 As case law interpret-
ing state RICO statutes continues to grow, it is reasonable to believe
that other states will be attracted to the advantages that such a power-
ful prosecutorial tool can offer.
2. Justifications for State RICO
Advocates of state RICO statutes have offered a variety ofjustifica-
tions for their co-existence with a federal RICO statute.34 One scholar
27 This was due, in part, to federal prosecutors' initial reluctance to charge defend-
ants with RICO violations because of uncertainty as to the potential benefits and advan-
tages of RICO. See Ira H. Raphaelson & Michelle D. Bernard, RICO and the "Operation or
Management" Test: The Potential Chilling Effect on Criminal Prosecutions, 28 U. RIcH. L. RE.
669, 672 (1994).
28 Blakey & Perry, supra note 19, at 988. There are, however, no Hawaii state appel-
late court opinions interpreting the "enterprise" requirement of the statute, the subject of
this Note. The state legislature amended the definitional section of the RICO statute
twice, in 1990 and 1991, but made no changes to the enterprise element.
The only judicial interpretation of the Hawaii RICO statute was made by a federal
court in Nakamoto v. Hartley, 758 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Haw. 1991). This case addressed
statutes-of-limitations issue in a civil case unrelated to the topic of this Note.
29 Blakey & Perry, supra note 19, at 988, 992.
30 Id. at 988-1011. These states are: New Mexico (1980), Georgia (1980), Indiana
(1980), NewJersey (1981), Utah (1981), Colorado (1981), Idaho (1981), Oregon (1981),
Wisconsin (1982), Illinois (1982), Connecticut (1982), North Dakota (1983), Nevada
(1983), Louisiana (1983), Mississippi (1984), Washington (1985), Ohio (1986), Tennessee
(1986), NewYork (1986), Delaware (1986), North Carolina (1986), Oklahoma (1988), and
Minnesota (1989).
31 See ABRAMs, supra note 16, § 7.28a.
32 See id. § 7.1.
33 For a brief discussion of the Massachusetts effort to pass a state RICO statute, see
Leblang, supra note 6 nn.3, 28-31, 58 & 85.
34 One Florida commentator offered general justifications for all forms of RICO, state
and federal:
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recently offered four compelling justifications.3 5 First, enforcement
of federal RICO is often limited to only the most well-developed crimi-
nal syndicates, and states have far greater prosecutorial resources to
combat local enterprise criminality.3 6 In the long run, it is far more
advantageous for states to have the ability to enhance punishment for
the relatively large numbers of small-time criminal organizations than
it is to focus federal RICO prosecutions exclusively on one or two
large syndicates.3 7
One advantage is that RICO Acts solve the deficiency in other criminal stat-
utes that incarcerate the individual members of the organizations engaged
in criminal activity, but rarely eliminate the organizations. Another advan-
tage is that RICO Acts eliminate problems involving evidence gathering and
constitutional protections, which prosecutors previously encountered in
prosecuting organized crime. Other advantages of RICO Acts include the
availability of civil remedies to prosecutors and affected individuals, harsher
penalties and new sanctions, injunctions to prevent defendants from using
assets gained from racketeering to obtain legal representation or to prepare
a defense, and expanded doctrines regarding admissibility of evidence.
Daley, supra note 6, at 382 (footnotes omitted).
35 Leblang, supra note 6, at 8-84. Leblang offers several methods to control
prosecutorial discretion, which this Note will discuss more fully below, but he also makes a
strong argument for retaining and strategically utilizing RICO at the state level.
36 As ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote, "Overlapping criminal remedies do not present
much of a problem, because state and federal prosecutions tend to work things out on a
sensible basis of resource allocation." William Rehnquist, Get RICO Cases Out of My Court-
room, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1989, at A14.
One RICO manual noted that the U.S. Department ofJustice RICO Guidelines pro-
vide that "RICO prosecutions will generally be reserved for important cases where there is
evidence of organized criminal activity infiltrating and affecting the nation's economy."
JED S. RAKOFF & HowARD W. GOLDSTEIN, RICO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW AND STRATEGY
§ 5.04(1) (a) (1994). For a discussion of the RICO guidelines, see infra text accompanying
notes 265-68.
Statistics also illustrate the degree of federal RICO prosecutions. In 1989, the Crimi-
nal Division's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, responsible for reviewing all
potential federal RICO prosecutions, authorized 111 RICO indictments. Coffey, supra
note 6, at 1038 n.18 (noting that this is within the average number of annual federal RICO
prosecutions). Of these, 29 RICO prosecutions involved charges of public corruption. Id.
at 1040. Because federal RICO prosecutions are more likely to target large and complex
criminal organizations, it is not surprising that the 10 cities in which federal RICO prosecu-
tions are most common are Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Miami, Newark,
Tampa, Los Angeles, Detroit, and Washington, D.C. Id. at 1039 n.23.
37 ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote that federal prosecutors "concentrate on the fraudu-
lent schemes that are either too big or too widespread for efficient state prosecution. Gar-
den-variety frauds and swindles are left to the state courts." Rehnquist, supra note 36, at
A14.
The U.S. Department ofJustice Guidelines require that "all RICO criminal and civil
actions brought by the federal government must receive prior approval from the Organ-
ized Crime and Racketeering Section in Washington, D.C." CIM. DIV., U.S. DEP'T OFJUS-
TiCE, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR
FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 127 (2d rev. ed. 1988) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. The manual states
that "RICO should only be invoked in those cases where it meets a special need or serves a
special purpose that would not be met by prosecution only on the underlying charges." Id.
at 128. Approval is generally disfavored if RICO indictments rely essentially on violations
of state law, unless "there is a legitimate reason for doing so." Id. at 129; see also RAKOFF &
GOLDSTiN, supra note 36, § 5.06 (citing the same requirement). A "legitimate reason" can
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Second, states without RICO statutes might be forced to turn a
case over to the federal authorities that state authorities would be bet-
ter suited to pursue. An ongoing investigation by local law enforce-
ment that ultimately reveals evidence that would support a RICO
prosecution should be handled by the agencies that have pursued the
case from the beginning: state and local prosecutors. The absence of
state RICO would likely force prosecutors to choose between merely
prosecuting the underlying criminal acts or turning the case over to
the U.S. Attorney and washing their hands of the entire case. Neither
alternative is satisfactory.
Third, local and state authorities are often far more knowledgea-
ble than their federal counterparts about enterprise criminality in the
areas where they have been working for long periods of time. This is
particularly true in rural areas where there are no F.B.I. or U.S. Attor-
ney offices, and members of local law enforcement have grown up in
the very communities they serve.
Finally, state RICO statutes often provide state prosecutors ad-
ministrative and evidentiary advantages. In a state RICO prosecution,
even though the predicate acts themselves might have been commit-
ted in many counties, the case can be consolidated and tried in a sin-
gle county, eliminating most venue problems. Furthermore, RICO
prosecutions often make it easier for juries to see the entire picture of
the criminal organization rather than a confusing morass of individ-
ual, and seemingly unrelated, criminal acts committed over a long pe-
riod of time.38 State RICO prosecutions therefore allow juries to see
the connections between multiple crimes rather than a disjointed ar-
ray of criminal activities.
usually be found if the following circumstances exist: "(1) Where local law enforcement
authorities are unlikely to prosecute crimes in which the federal government has signifi-
cant interest; (2) Where there is significant organized crime involvement; and (3) Where
prosecution of political or governmental figures may pose special problems for local prose-
cutors." RAKors & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 36, § 5.06(1).
38 See Rudolph W. Giuliani, Legal Remedies for Attacking Organized Crime, reprinted in
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, MAJOR ISSUES IN ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL 103, 106
(1988). Mr. Giuliani is now the mayor of New York City.
One commentator explained that since the government is able "to indict the entire
hierarchy" of an organized criminal association, RICO "is the only criminal statute that
enables the government to present ajury with the whole picture of how an enterprise, such
as an organized crime family, operates." RAKOFF & GoLDsEIN, supra note 36, § 9.01(2).
This permits prosecutors to portray "a defendant's whole life in crime." Id.
Most RICO statutes allow prosecutors to reach back in time to pick up predicate acts
that did not occur closely in time. One commentator, discussing the federal RICO statute,
pointed out that "the [RICO] prosecutor must show little more than two predicate viola-
tions over a ten-year period." Charles N. Whitaker, Note, Federal Prosecution of State and
Local Bribey: Inappropriate Tools and the Need for a Structured Approach, 78 VA. L. REv. 1617,
1646 (1992).
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State officials themselves have advanced similar justifications. In
New York, former prosecutor Steven Kessler argued that "state prose-
cutors felt frustrated and short changed by the existing laws."3 9 Kess-
ler explained that instead of having the tools to prosecute enterprise
criminality themselves, "state authorities were compelled to surrender
their cases to federal authorities for prosecution under federal law."40
As a result, state authorities had to rely almost exclusively on limited
federal resources to combat enterprise criminality. By passing state
RICO statutes, legislatures have acted to protect local autonomy and
restore some control to local law enforcement agencies when viola-
tions of state law occur.
Oregon's attorney general, David Frohnmayer, called Oregon's
RICO statute "a potent new weapon in the state's arsenal against or-
ganized criminal activity."4' Frohnmayer countered critics who ar-
gued that state RICO was not needed when federal RICO existed. He
explained that, with few exceptions, the Department ofJustice would
not authorize a federal RICO count if the predicate acts consisted
solely of state offenses.42 According to Frohnmayer, "[w]ithout state
RICOs, the position taken by federal prosecutors with regard to use of
the federal RICO would essentially leave criminals free from prosecu-
tion under federal RICO so long as they avoided commission of fed-
eral predicate offenses." 43 Therefore, Frohnmayer views state RICO as
a necessary assumption of state responsibility for instances of enter-
prise criminality that federal authorities do not have the resources to
prosecute.
3. Narrowly Targeted Variations of State RICO
At least two states have adopted modified and limited RICO stat-
utes directed toward particular forms of criminal activity. For exam-
ple, Iowa's Crime Control Act targets "criminal street gangs" and
provides an offense for a "pattern of criminal gang activity."44 Iowa
courts have interpreted this statute to reach defendants who are mer-
39 Kessler, supra note 2, at 801.
40 Id.
41 David B. Frohnmayer et al., RICO: Oregon's Message to Organized Crime, 18 Wiuam-
mrE L. REv. 1, 20 (1982).
42 Id. at 5.
43 Id.
44 IowA CODE: ANN. § 723A.1 (West 1993). The Iowa legislature defined "criminal
street gang" (the analogue to "enterprise") as follows:
[A]ny ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more per-
sons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the
commission of one or more criminal acts, which has an identifiable name
or identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or collec-
tively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.
As this Note will illustrate, this statute is both broader and narrower than most state RICO
statutes. It is narrower in that its application is limited to "criminal street gangs" and not
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bers of street gangs and ride along on drive-by shootings.4: 5 This stat-
ute gives prosecutors a powerful tool to combat the increase in
criminal activity committed by gangs whose members are rarely willing
to point to a fellow member as the perpetrator of a particular crime.46
Another state that restricts its RICO statute to "criminal street
gangs" is Texas.47 Unlike Iowa, Texas restricts its RICO statute to a list
of particular criminal activities, mostly violent, controlled-substance,
or sexual offenses.48 Texas courts have explained that to be guilty of
organized criminal activity, a defendant must commit or conspire to
commit one or more of the enumerated crimes with the specific in-
tent of participating in a group of at least five persons.49 Both of these
examples represent states that have significantly departed from the
federal RICO model and indicate the potential for state innovation to
fashion a RICO statute that best fits the needs of a particular criminal
justice system.
Combined with the use of federal RICO against well-developed,
interstate street gangs, state RICO can offer a secondary weapon
against the criminal activity of these gangs on a local level. The street
gangs of the 1990s contain all the elements of criminal syndicates,
with members occupying hierarchical positions like the "kingpin,"
enterprises. It is broader in that it criminalizes patterns of any "criminal acts" rather than
allowing only particular types of crime to qualify as predicate acts.
At first, it would seem that this statute violates the First Amendment rights of free
association and free speech by using signs and symbols to identify potential predicate acts.
However, regarding the right to free association, the Iowa Supreme Court recently held
that because "[me]ere association is insufficient" to support a RICO prosecution, the consti-
tutional attack "fails." State v. Walker, 506 N.W.2d 480, 433 (Iowa 1993). The Iowa appel-
late courts have not yet addressed a First Amendment challenge to the inclusion of signs or
symbols in the definition of "criminal street gang."
45 See, e.g., State v. Browne, 494 N.W.2d 241 (Iowa 1992), cert. denie, 113 S. Ct. 3051
(1993) (defendant, a member of a gang called the Black Gangster Disciples, yelled to an-
other gang member to "cap the bitch," meaning to "shoot the woman in the window,"
which the gang member did).
46 It is not surprising that some states see criminal street gangs as particularly danger-
ous forms of organized criminal activity. According to the executive director of the Chi-
cago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, "'In some areas, you're getting a transformation
from gangs which are not only youth gangs to something much closer to organized crime,
they're much more into the drug business.'" William Recktenwald &Jennifer Lenhart, The
Killing Way Weighs Heavily, CHI. TaB., Sept. 29, 1992, § 2, at 1, 7.
47 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.01 (West 1994). Texas defines "criminal street gang"
as "three or more persons having a common identifying sign or symbol or an identifiable
leadership who continuously or regularly associate in the commission of criminal activi-
ties." Id.
48 Id. § 71.02.
49 See, e.g., Renfro v. State, 827 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
The Kentucky legislature designed a similar statute to target "criminal syndicates,"
which it defines as five or more persons who collaborate to "promote or engage in" any of
a list of specified crimes "on a continuing basis." Ky. R v. STAT. ANN. § 506.120(3) (Bald-
win 1990).
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"boss," "lookout," "hawker," "steerer," "runner," and "bang-bang."50
One student commentator argued that the "sophisticated urban street
gang of the 1990s holds a place in society that highly organized crimi-
nal organizations like the Mafia have traditionally occupied." 1' Fur-
thermore, although non-RICO statutes targeting street gangs are not a
subject of extensive consideration in this Note, it bears noting that
some states have "gang statutes" and "criminal syndicate statutes" in
addition to their RICO statutes, providing a double-barrelled assault
on organized street crime, which prosecutors are beginning to use in
tandem with RICO prosecutions by charging forms of compound
liability.5 2
It is reasonable to believe that, like federal prosecutors, state pros-
ecutors will soon turn to RICO as their tool of choice to combat polit-
ical corruption, organized street crime, and a wide variety of white-
collar crime.5 3 Many of these state RICO statutes are in their infancy,
and most states with RICO have few appellate court opinions that fo-
cus on RICO provisions, especially the enterprise definition. The next
Part will analyze how the states have modeled and departed from the
federal RICO statute in drafting their definitions of enterprise, a criti-
cal component of any RICO prosecution, and one whose efficacy has
been the subject of extensive debate.
II
DEFINITIONAL ANALYSIS OF ENTERPRISE
A. The Federal Enterprise as the Model Definition
The federal RICO statute defines enterprise as including "any in-
dividual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
50 Some of the discussion in this paragraph is taken from Lesley Bonney's excellent
Comment on RICO prosecutions of street gangs. Lesley S. Bonney, Comment, The Prosecu-
tion of Sophisticated Urban Street Gangs: A Proper Application of RICO, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 579,
601 (1993). Bonney's article provides a thorough analysis of the potential benefits of pros-
ecuting criminal street gangs under federal RICO.
51 Id. at 606.
52 See Susan W. Brenner, RICO, CCE, and Other Complex Crimes: The Transformation of
American Criminal Law?, 2 WM. & MARY, BILL RTs.J. 239, 278-82 (1993).
53 See Raphaelson & Bernard, supra note 27, at 674-75, for a discussion of the slow
development of federal RICO prosecution that experienced a sudden boom in the mid-
1980s. Federal RICO identified the areas mentioned in the text as probable state RICO
areas of focus; see also People v. Wakefield Fin. Corp., 590 N.Y.S.2d 382, 389 (Sup. Ct. 1992)
(declaring that "the court rejects the suggestion that the Enterprise Corruption statute was
not intended to cover 'ordinary white collar crime,' and that it was designed only for the
'Mafia'").
See generally Edwin H. Stier & Peter R. Richards, Strategic Decision Making in Organized
Crime ControL The Need for a Broadened Perspective, reprinted in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF Jus-
TICE, MAJOR IssuEs IN ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL 65 (1988) (discussing the evolutionary
process of organized crime from the minor to the major forms of activity and arguing that
it is advantageous to stop the development of organized crime in its early stages).
19951
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not
a legal entity. '54 This definition remains constant throughout the
RICO statute and applies to each instance in which the word "enter-
prise" appears. 55
An enterprise is basically any entity that a criminal can infiltrate
or participate in as an associate. As one scholar stated, "Congress
knew that an enterprise could be almost anything."56 The definition
of enterprise is not intended to be close-ended. Instead, the use of
the word includes indicates that the list that follows is only illustrative.57
Thus, as one commentator noted, "Congress deliberately chose as
broad and vague a term as possible, to cover every possible subject of
organized crime penetration, and the definition given to it was equally
open ended. 58
A RICO enterprise can be virtually any legal entity, from the most
complex multi-national corporations to sole proprietorships to gov-
ernment entities. As the federal statute's definition indicates, the
RICO enterprise can even be an individual if, for example, a relative
criminally mismanages a decedent's estate. 59 An enterprise can also
include sole proprietorships, partnerships, labor unions, and any
other legal entity even if that entity consists solely of a single person.60
Apart from legal entities, proof of an association in fact can also
satisfy the enterprise requirement. 61 This can be an informal associa-
tion or collaboration between legal entities or individuals through
which a pattern of criminal activity occurs. The United States
Supreme Court has held that under the federal RICO statute, an asso-
54 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994).
55 As this Note will explain in greater detail below, a recent United States Supreme
Court opinion, National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994), rejected
the argument that a RICO enterprise must be motivated by an economic purpose. Id. at
800. The Court noted that though the word enterprise entails functional differences in
each type of crime (e.g., acquisition of an enterprise, maintenance of an enterprise, or
association with an enterprise), the definition of enterprise remains the same. Thus the
meaning and scope of enterprise might shift throughout the different violations, but the
definition does not. Id. at 804-05.
This Note is concerned with definitional comparison and analysis. Therefore, as a
conceptual matter, it is preferable to analyze the RICO enterprise as that entity through
which a defendant commits the violative predicate acts or with which a defendant associ-
ates to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity.
56 Lynch, supra note 11, at 771.
57 See GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 27 ("[T]he courts have held that the list of enu-
merated entities is not exhaustive but merely illustrative.").
58 Lynch, supra note 11, at 771.
59 One interesting example of an individual constituting the RICO enterprise can be
found in Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The defendant was
convicted of conducting the affairs of his wife through a pattern of racketeering activity.
60 See GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at 26-34, for a thorough list of the types of enter-
prises that federal courts have reviewed.
61 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (1994).
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ciation in fact enterprise must be an "ongoing organization, formal or
informal," whose members "function as a continuing unit" that is sep-
arate from the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages.62
As this Note reveals below, states do not consistently follow this ap-
proach to associations in fact and have adopted various other stan-
dards to determine when this type of enterprise exists. 63
B. The States Draft: Definition and Interpretation
Although states have used federal RICO as a model upon which
to base their own RICO statutes, most states did not simply copy the
language of the federal statute verbatim. In fact, a majority of states
built upon the federal model in order to expand the reach and reme-
dies of state RICO. 64 Most states now regard their RICO statutes as
broader than the federal RICO statute in language, scope, and in-
tended criminal targets.6 5 Two legal commentators from Georgia
have argued that the state statutes are "broader than federal RICO
and even more difficult to comprehend."66
62 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). Part III will discuss Turkette
more fully and focus on how courts have interpreted the enterprise element.
63 It is wise to mention here that RICO associations in fact do not function in the
same way as common-law conspiracy. For one thing, members of an association in fact
generally do not need to know of the existence of all other members in order be a part of
the association. See, e.g., State v. Cheek, 786 P.2d 1305 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 794
P.2d 793 (Or. 1990). This Note will discuss the Cheek decision in greater detail infra part
III.D.2.
64 For example, Arizona's RICO statute has been called "one of the broadest state
anti-racketeering statutes in the nation." Murphy, supra note 19, at 299. AZRAC, as it is
called, includes the entire array of federal civil remedies including treble damages, injunc-
tions, forfeiture, divestiture, dissolution of the organization, costs of prosecution, and at-
torney's fees. ARuz. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314 (1989). The comparable remedy provisions
combined with the elimination of the requirements found in federal RICO that the enter-
prise affect commerce and that a pattern of racketeering activity be shown make Arizona
RICO much broader in scope than federal RICO. Murphy, supra note 19, at 299 n.12. For
an Arizona case explaining that AZRAC is broader in scope than federal RICO, see State ex
rel. Corbin v. Pickrell, 667 P.2d 1304, 1310-11 (Ariz. 1983).
65 See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 596 So. 2d 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Blalock v. An-
neewakee, Inc., 426 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, (Ga. Feb. 5, 1993); State v.
Ball, 632 A.2d 1222 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 661 A.2d 251 (NJ. 1995); State v.
Cheek, 786 P.2d 1305 (Or. Ct. App.), review deni, 794 P.2d 793 (Or. 1990).
See also G. Robert Blakey & Greg A. Walker, Emerging Issues Under the Colorado Organized
Crime Control Act-Colorado's Little RICO, 18 COLO. LAW. 2077, 2078 (1989) (arguing that
the legislative history shows that "the intent that COCCA apply beyond 'organized crime' is
unequivocal"); Daley, supra note 6, at 383 ("Florida's current RICO Act now reaches a
broader scope of criminal conduct not originally envisioned by the federal RICO Act.").
66 Kenny & Smith, supra note 2, at 538. Kenny and Smith go on to suggest, however,
that calling state RICO statutes "Baby RICOs" can be misleading, "inasmuch as it suggests
that [state] RICO [statutes are] merely.., state analog[s] of federal RICO." Id. n.9 (The
authors specifically discuss the Georgia RICO statute, but their comments are applicable to
all state RICO statutes.).
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Some states have patterned their RICO statutes after both the fed-
eral RICO model and models from other states.67 Not a single state,
however, has engaged in wholesale adoption of the federal defini-
tions, particularly the definition of "enterprise." One scholar has sug-
gested that legislatures have changed their state RICO statutes in
some cases "to expand the definitions, and in other cases to clarify the
definitions in response to federal judicial decisions."68
Because many state RICO statutes are still in their infancies, there
are often few state appellate court opinions to which a trial court can
look for aid in interpretation. As a result, most state courts look to
federal court opinions interpreting the language of the federal RICO
statute for guidance in interpreting state RICO.6 9 Few states, however,
regard federal opinions as controlling or even persuasive authority.
In some states, like Florida, "l[t] he courts have looked to federal deci-
sions interpreting the federal RICO Act for guidance in certain areas,
but in other areas have chosen to reject the federal interpretation of
the federal Act and to fashion the Florida Act differently."70
A Georgia appeals court recently held that "federal circuit court
opinions regarding the federal statute, while instructive, do not con-
trol our construction or application of the Georgia RICO statute."71
New Jersey courts will not allow federal court decisions conflicting
with state RICO to control because it "would fly in the face of... New
Jersey legislative intent and would erode the beneficial purposes of
the New Jersey Statute."72 The strongest statement against the con-
trolling effect of federal case law can be found in Pennsylvania. Even
though Pennsylvania courts view federal court opinions as "persua-
sive," a recent court held that "when interpreting our corrupt organi-
zations statute, we are not bound by the mandates of the United States
Supreme Court decisions."73
67 See, e.g., Frohnmayer et al., supra note 41, at 6-7 (explaining that "the Oregon defi-
nition is similar to Florida's"). It is not surprising that Florida RICO is a popular model for
other states to follow given that it is one of the most heavily litigated RICO statutes in the
nation. See Daley, supra note 6, at 386-87, 393-94.
In Part II.C, this Note will detail examples of other states that share the same or simi-
lar enterprise definitions. Washington adopted a definition almost identical Oregon's def-
inition. Colorado, Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee have also closely followed the
Florida model.
68 Frohnmayer et al., supra note 41, at 7.
69 See ABRtAMs, supra note 16, § 7.1. Abrams explains this phenomenon by arguing
that "[f]ederal decisions frequently abound, thus sparing counsel and court the necessity
of writing on a blank slate." Id.
70 Daley, supra note 6, at 395.
71 Blalock v. Anneewakee, Inc., 426 S.E.2d 165, 167 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied,
(Ga. Feb. 5, 1998).
72 State v. Ball, 632 A.2d 1222, 1239 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 661 A.2d
291 (NJ. 1995).
73 Commonwealth v. Donahue, 630 A.2d 1238, 1245 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), appeal de-
nied, 645 A.2d 1316 (Pa. 1994).
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Though Florida is the only state with a relatively large body of
case law reviewing the state RICO statute, it is not surprising that
many other states refuse to look to federal case law as dispositive case
authority. It is evident from the discussion above that state RICO stat-
utes differ from the federal RICO statute in many ways, particularly
when the state statute is targeted toward a specific type of criminal
activity. Further, state RICO developed in part because of the limited
application of federal RICO. State courts probably interpret their
RICO statutes in light of the smaller-scale crimes that they address and
that the federal RICO statute is unable to reach. To many state
courts, state RICO is simply another state law, and, barring federal
constitutional challenges, state courts will interpret it in light of their
own development of RICO case law and canons of statutory interpre-
tation.74 The fact that these are state statutes is, of course, the best
and only necessary reason why federal case law is not binding.
Even though in most states (except Florida) case law interpreting
state RICO is still in the early stages of development, as the years go by
and prosecutors make greater use of the state RICO tool, states will
develop their own body of case law to interpret their RICO statutes.
One scholar noted that most "[state] courts have not yet reached the
bounds of persuasion" in their RICO case law.75 In other words, many
state RICO cases, including those interpreting the definitions of enter-
prise and pattern of racketeering activity, are cases of first impression.
Therefore, the 1990s is quickly becoming the decade in which state
courts are breaking a significant amount of new ground in the inter-
pretation of state RICO statutes.
As state RICO prosecutions continue to generate appellate court
opinions, state courts might also begin looking to other state courts
for persuasive guidance because the nature and degree of criminal
prosecutions among the states are more similar than between state
74 Two recent state court opinions demonstrate the conflict state courts experience
when their RICO statutes are in their infancies. In Fefris v. Bakery, Confectionery and
Tobacco Union, Local 26, 867 P.2d 38 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993), the Colorado Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that "absent a prior interpretation by our state courts, federal case law con-
struing [RICO] is instructive." Id. at 46 (footnote omitted). Therefore, Colorado looks to
state court opinions first, but when there are none, resorting to federal case law for assist-
ance is not improper.
Another appellate court gave less deference to federal case law. In Blalock v. An-
neewakee, Inc., 426 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, (Ga. Feb. 5, 1993), the
Georgia appellate court held that "federal circuit court opinions regarding the federal
statute, while instructive, do not control our construction or application of the Georgia
RICO statute." Id. at 167. Although the court would not completely ignore federal case
law, it is clear that federal case law has little or no persuasive authority in Georgia; see also
Commonwealth v. Dennis, 618 A.2d 972 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that federal case
law is instructive but not controlling in the interpretation of Pennsylvania RICO), appeal
denie, 634 A.2d 218 (Pa. 1993).
75 ABRAms, supra note 16, § 7.1.
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RICO and federal RICO prosecutions. One commentator has even
suggested that "courts interpreting federal RICO likewise might be
persuaded by decisions interpreting state RICO statutes."76 Such is
not the reality yet, but the body of state case law is growing rapidly,
and many of the issues that have already been debated in federal
court will soon be resolved in state courts as well. Consequently, in
the near future, the body of state case law will itself become persuasive
authority in its own right.
C. Comparative Analysis of State RICO "Enterprise"
The most elementary method of comparing the development of
the enterprise definition in state RICO statutes is to analyze the differ-
ent words that are used. Though the basic structure of the definitions
are the same, the intended scope and illustrative examples included
in the statutory definition vary from state to state. This Part will briefly
compare the variations in terminology that the states exhibit in their
definitions of enterprise.
Although no state has enacted a definition of enterprise that is
identical to the federal RICO definition, some states have defined en-
terprise in similar ways. Delaware and the Virgin Islands have defini-
tions with exactly the same scope, but slightly different language. 77
Other states with identical scopes, but slightly different language, in-
clude Colorado, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee.7 8
Finally, a pair of neighboring states, Oregon and Washington, have
almost identical definitions.79
76 Id.
77 Delaware's definition: " 'Enterprise' shall include any individual, sole proprietor-
ship, partnership, corporation, trust or other legal entity, and any union, association or
group of persons associated in fact, although not a legal entity. The word 'enterprise' shall
include illicit as well as licit enterprises, and governmental as well as other entities." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1502(3) (1993).
The Virgin Islands' definition: " 'Enterprise' includes any individual, sole proprietor-
ship, partnership, corporation, trust, or other legal entity, or any union, association or
group of persons, associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as
licit enterprises and governmental as well as other entities." V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14,
§ 604(h) (Supp. 1995).
78 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-17-103(2) (West 1986); FA. STAT. ANN.
§ 772.102(3) (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-3(6) (1992 & Supp. 1993); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75D-3(a) (1990 & Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-203(3) (1991 &
Supp. 1994).
79 The common definition is as follows: "'Enterprise' includes any individual, sole
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust or other profit or nonprofit legal
entity, and includes any union, association or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity, and both illicit and licit enterprises and governmental and
nongovernmental entities." OR. REv. STAT. § 166.715(2) (1990 & Supp. 1994); see also
WASH. Rxv. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.010(12) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (the only differences
being two commas: one after "business trust" and the other after "association").
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One important indicator of the scope of a state's enterprise defi-
nition is whether the statute uses the operative word means or includes.
In general, use of the word means indicates that the following list is
inclusive and limited to that list. On the other hand, use of the word
includes indicates that the following list is illustrative and not close-
ended. Of the states that have not limited their RICO statutes to nar-
row categories of criminal activity, eighteen have used the word means
in the enterprise definition, 0 and twelve have used the word includes
in the definition.8' It is difficult to understand why critics argue that
state RICO statutes are modeled directly on the federal RICO statute
when less than half of the states with RICO statutes follow the federal
model in this critical portion of the definition.8 2
However, the choice of the word means or includes does not always
mean that the scope of that state's RICO statute is narrow or broad.
Some states that use the word means have a surprisingly complete and
expansive laundry list,8 3 while some states that use the word includes
have a more limited, but open-ended list.8 4 Therefore, though it is
sometimes an important indicator of legislative intent, the legisla-
ture's choice between means and includes does not necessarily corre-
spond to the scope of the enterprise contemplated by the state RICO
statute.
The scope of a particular state's definition of enterprise is best
ascertained by looking to the breadth of the list included. There are
three categories of enterprise that every state RICO statute includes in
the definition: corporations, associations that are legal entities, and
80 These states are Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin.
81 These states are Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma.
Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, the Virgin Islands, and Washington.
82 The use of the word means or includes is important because it signals a general
legislative and prosecutorial philosophy toward the scope of the state RICO statute.
83 See, e.g., FiA. STAT. ANN. § 895.02(3) (West 1994) defining enterprise as:
[A]ny individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business
trust, union chartered under the laws of this state, or other legal entity, or
any unchartered union, association, or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity;, and it includes illicit as well as licit enter-
prises and governmental, as well as other, entities.
84 See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 842-1 (1994) ("'Enterprise' includes any sole pro-
prietorship, partnership, corporation, association, and any union or group of individuals
associated for a particularly purpose although not a legal entity"). Note that the Hawaii
definition does not explicitly include individuals, persons, other legal entities, trusts (busi-
ness or otherwise), government entities, and illicit as well as licit organizations.
Puerto Rico uses the word includes, has a restrictive list of examples, and has the only
RICO statute that explicitly excepts certain types of enterprises from the RICO net. "Enter-
prise" includes "any partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity, and any
union or group of associated individuals, even though it is not constituted into a legal
entity, except those that are associated mainly for social, family or political purposes." P.R.
LAws ANNr. tit. 25, § 971a(f) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
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associations in fact.8 5 These three entities are the most commonly liti-
gated types of enterprises in the federal courts for both criminal and
civil RICO cases, which might partially explain their consistent ap-
pearance in state RICO statutes.8 6
Of the states that do not specifically restrict their RICO statutes,
twenty of them include either person or individual in the enterprise
definition.8 7 One state, Nevada, restricts the scope of person to reach
only "natural person[s]."88 A related, but more popular, category is
sole praprietorships, included in the definitions of twenty-five state RICO
statutes.8 9 Its greater occurrence in state RICO statutes might be due
to its common recognition as a legal entity.90 Twenty-eight states in-
clude partnerships in their definitions of enterprise. 91 Twenty-eight
states also include unions in their definitions.92 Twenty-nine states in-
clude the catch-all phrase other legal entities in their enterprise defini-
tions to reach any legally recognized association that the other
categories do not cover.93
85 Ohio includes both "association" and "organization" in its definition of enterprise.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2923.31(C) (Anderson 1993). This is a distinction that this author
is at a loss to explain.
It is possible that organization has a technical legal definition in Ohio. In Ohio's ver-
sion of the Uniform Commercial Code, a set of laws governing commercial transactions,
"organization" is defined as including "a corporation, government, governmental subdivi-
sion or agency, business trust, estate, trust, parmership, or association, two or more per-
sons having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or commercial entity." OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 1301.01 (BB) (Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1994). Ironically, this definition
includes many entities that are separately included in the Ohio RICO definition of
enterprise.
One Louisiana court stated in rather broad terms that an "enterprise... is an entity
established for the purpose of engaging in a course of conduct." State v. Nine Say. Ac-
counts, 553 So. 2d 823, 826 (La. 1989).
86 See GUIDELINES, supra note 37, at 26-34, 40-50, for a discussion of the most common
federal RICO cases and advice regarding particular difficulties in charging and proof
87 The states that do not include person or individual are Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Indi-
ana, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.
88 NEv. Rv. STAT. § 207.380 (1992).
89 The states that do not explicitly include sole proprietorships are Arizona, Illinois,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Puerto Rico.
90 See infra part III.B.1 for a discussion of cases holding that a person cannot associate
with himself to constitute the RICO enterprise often because there is no identifiable legal
entity that is separate from the individual through which the person can commit the pat-
tern of racketeering activity. On the other hand, most states allow a sole proprietorship to
constitute an enterprise because it is a legal entity identified separately from the individual
owner. However, as this Note will discuss, some states do not allow sole proprietorships to
constitute the RICO enterprise if they have no other employees.
91 The states that do not are Connecticut and North Dakota. Ohio also includes in its
enterprise definition the category of "limited partnership [s]." OHIO Rav. CODE ANN.
§ 2923.31(C) (Anderson 1993).
92 The states that do not include "unions" are Hawaii and Louisiana.
93 The only state that does not include this phrase is Hawaii. Both Oregon and Wash-
ington extend the reach of this clause to include both profit and nonprofit legal entities.
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Many states' definitions also include other types of entities.
Eighteen states include trusts or business trusts in the definition of en-
terprise.94 Twenty-two states specifically note that their definitions in-
clude both illicit and licit enterprises to avoid any presumption that the
statute only covers legitimate enterprises.95 Twenty states also include
government entities in the definition of enterprise.96 Two states, Idaho
and New Mexico, include "business" in the range of enterprises
reached by state RICO, though it is unclear why each state's legisla-
ture paid special attention to business when both statutes reach any
other legal entity.97 Three states, Indiana, North Dakota, and Wisconsin,
include the limited liability company as a unique addition to the enter-
prise definition. 98 Like other additions states make to the federal
model, it is unclear why the enterprise definition would not otherwise
cover limited liability companies. Perhaps limited liability companies
would be covered, but the state legislatures merely wanted to ensure
that courts would not unintentionally exclude certain types of enter-
prises. Finally, only one state, Pennsylvania, requires the RICO enter-
prise to be engaged in commerce.99
New York's RICO statute' 00 contains unique elements that merit
separate consideration. First, an enterprise must be "an ascertainable
structure distinct from a pattern of criminal activity."101 As this Note
will demonstrate, in many association-in-fact cases, proof of the pat-
94 New Jersey includes any "business or charitable trust" in its definition. NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:41-1(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1995). States that do not include any trusts in their
definitions are Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, and Rhode Island.
95 States that do not observe this distinction are Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, and Rhode Island. Oklahoma makes this distinc-
tion a bit differently by noting that the enterprise can be engaged in "any lawful or unlaw-
ful project or undertaking." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1402(2) (Supp. 1995).
Some states have included this phrase in response to the United States Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), holding that the term enter-
prise in federal RICO covered both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. This resolved
an ambiguity in the federal statute. See infra part HIA for a more detailed discussion of
Turkette
96 The states that do not include governmental bodies are Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, and Utah.
97 See IDAHO CODE § 18-7803(c) (1987 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42- 3(C)
(Michie 1989 & Supp. 1995).
98 See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-1 (West 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01(2) (b)
(1985 & Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.82(2) (West Supp. 1995).
99 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 911(h)(3) (West 1983 & Supp. 1995). Though at first
blush, this might seem to exclude many types of criminal associations in fact, it does in-
clude criminal enterprises that engage in the sale of illegal drugs. See Commonwealth v.
Dennis, 618 A.2d 972 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
100 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 460 (McKinney 1994).
101 Id. § 460.10 (emphasis added). This is probably in response to federal cases requir-
ing the same element See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) and the
discussion infra part IIIL.
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tern of racketeering activity can also be used to prove the enterprise.
New York's RICO statute also provides a separate intent element for
participation in the enterprise.10 2 No RICO prosecution can be
brought in one district of New York that includes charges significantly
derived from activity occurring in another district without approval by
the district attorney in the second district.10 3 Finally, whenever a pros-
ecutor files a RICO indictment, he must submit a statement to the
court certifying that the charge is consistent with the New York legisla-
ture's findings when it originally passed the state RICO. 104 Therefore,
even though New York RICO contains a relatively broad enterprise
definition, prosecutorial constraints limit the practical effect of the
statute.' 05
III
CASE LAW ANALYSIS OF ENTERPRISE
The statutory definitions of enterprise constitute the foundation
of state RICO prosecutions. Built on this foundation, however, are
state appellate court opinions interpreting the broad definition of en-
terprise and determining the practical scope of this powerful statute.
Since many state courts do not yet have a large body of state RICO
case law, it is instructive to first briefly examine the federal case law
that has been most influential in the development of state RICO. This
Part will then proceed to analyze the development of state case law
interpreting various facets of the enterprise definition through spe-
cific case examples.
A. Two Significant Federal Cases
Federal case law determining the boundaries of the enterprise
element of the federal RICO statute is more developed than state case
law interpreting the enterprise elements of state RICO statutes. Two
United States Supreme Court cases continue to influence the develop-
ment of state RICO case law significantly: United States v. Turkette,10 6 a
criminal case interpreting enterprise, and National Organization for Wo-
men, Inc. v. Scheidler,10 7 a recent civil RICO case. These two cases are
102 For a comprehensive discussion of the differences between New York RICO and
federal RICO, see Ethan Brett Gerber, Note, "A RICO You Can't Refuse". New York's Organ-
ized Crime Control Act, 53 BRooK. L. REV. 979 (1988).
103 Leblang, supra note 6, at 105.
104 Id. at 104.
105 See infra part IV for the argument in favor of maintaining broad RICO definitions,
but limiting RICO through other methods such as the New York constraints. State legisla-
tures can constrain the reach of RICO without restrictive amendment of the enterprise
definition.
106 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
107 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
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important because some state courts have followed the Supreme
Court's general refusal to add requirements to the definition of
enterprise. 108
In Turkette, the Court decided "whether the term 'enterprise' as
used in RICO encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enter-
prises or is limited in application to the former." 0 9 Turkette was
charged with leading a group of individuals associated in fact to en-
gage in drug trafficking, arson, bribing police officers, and corrupting
the outcome of court proceedings. On appeal, the defendant argued
that "RICO does not make criminal the participation in an association
which performs only illegal acts and which has not infiltrated or at-
tempted to infiltrate a legitimate enterprise." 10
Rejecting the defendant's argument, the Court held that the
term enterprise encompassed both legitimate and illegitimate enter-
prises. The Court explained that "[t]here is no restriction upon the
associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise includes any
union or group of individuals associated in fact.""' In a critical
phrase, the Court reasoned that the definition "no more excludes
criminal enterprises than it does legitimate ones. Had Congress not
intended to reach criminal associations, it could easily have narrowed
the sweep of the definition by inserting a single word, 'legitimate."' 1 2
This statement signaled the Court's intention to interpret the enter-
prise requirement to include every type of enterprise that the statute
did not specifically exclude. 13
The Court reached this result without relying on the liberal con-
struction clause because the definition itself was intentionally broad
and non-exclusive. 114 The Court recognized that Congress could have
easily listed the exclusive entities that could function as the RICO en-
terprise, but it chose not to restrict the statute's scope because enter-
prise included any entity that can be infiltrated by or engaged in
criminal activity.115 Even though most states do not have liberal con-
108 See infra part mI.D.2, llI.D.5.
109 452 U.S. at 578.
110 Id. at 580.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 580-81.
113 The Court's rationale for its ruling was the "broad purposes" of the RICO statute.
Id. at 589. The Court explained that "[t]he result is neither absurd nor surprising. On the
contrary, insulating the wholly criminal enterprise from prosecution under RICO is the
more incongruous position." Id. at 587.
Further, in light of the statute's liberal construction clause, the Court believed that
there was no occasion to apply the rule of lenity to this statute as is the usual practice in the
interpretation of criminal statutes. Id. at 587 n.10. The Court explained that the rule of
lenity only applies when there is a need to resolve an ambiguity in a statute, and the Court
found no ambiguity in the federal RICO statute.
114 Id. at 580-81.
115 Id. at 593.
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struction clauses in their RICO statutes, most state courts follow the
Turkette analysis and interpret the enterprise requirement broadly
when there are no specific legislative restrictions.' 16
National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler," 7 a 1994 civil
case, followed the reasoning of Turkette. Scheidler involved a civil suit
by a group of health care clinics against the Pro-Life Action Network,
a group that organizes protests at abortion clinics. The Court held
that proof of a RICO enterprise does not require proof of an eco-
nomic motive"18
Though the suit was brought under § 1962 (c), regarding the use
of an enterprise as a vehicle through which the racketeering activity is
committed, the Court explained that "[n] owhere ... is there any indi-
cation that an economic motive is required."" 9 Following Turkette,
the Court held that a particular kind of enterprise falls within the
scope of the enterprise definition as long as Congress has not specifi-
cally excluded it. 1 20
For purposes of this Note, both of these cases are less important
for their specific holdings than for their judicial analysis and philoso-
phy regarding the RICO enterprise definition. Without relying on the
liberal construction clause, the United States Supreme Court indi-
cated its unwillingness to graft onto the enterprise definition require-
ments that do not comport with the ordinary meaning of the statutory
language. As this Note will demonstrate, some state courts have
adopted this philosophy.' 21 Other state courts, however, have subtly
asked what the legislature would have drafted had it considered the
imposition of a certain requirement. As a result, some courts have
adopted requirements for proof of the enterprise element that appear
nowhere in the statutory definition itself.
116 See infra part III.
17 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
118 Id. at 808-05. Incidentally, the Court also reaffirmed that the rule of lenity does not
apply to federal RICO because the statutory language is unambiguous. Id. at 806.
One commentator recently argued that through the Scheidler holding, "the Court ren-
dered almost every individual and group a potential RICO 'enterprise' and may have
turned RICO into a potent weapon for ideological harassment." Matthew C. Blicken-
sderfer, Note, UnleashingRICO, 17 HA2.v.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 867, 867 (1994). As the discus-
sion below will demonstrate, this author thinks that this argument overstates the
significance of the Scheidler opinion.
119 Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 804.
120 Id. at 805. One commentator argued that "Din all probability... the Scheidler
interpretation is unlikely to remain long intact" because "enterprise" is now "all-encom-
passing" and RICO will "run amok." Blickensderfer, supra note 118, at 893. This argument
overlooks the fact that the enterprise definition as interpreted by federal and state case law
is not unlimited in scope. Among other limits, courts have developed the "person-enter-
prise rule" and non-textual requirements for proving associations in fact. See infra part
III.B.1, SI.D.1, III.D.2.121 See infta part III.
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B. Individuals and Sole Proprietorships
As the definitional analysis above illustrates, most state enterprise
definitions include individuals and sole proprietorships. 22 This Part
will demonstrate the problems some states have encountered when
applying these enterprise definitions to specific factual situations.
Some states have extended the enterprise definition to single-em-
ployee sole proprietorships and sole proprietorships that only involve
occasional association with others, but other states have resisted this
interpretation.
1. A Person Cannot Associate with Himself
It is a virtually universal maxim in state RICO case law that a de-
fendant charged with associating with an enterprise to conduct or par-
ticipate in a pattern of racketeering activity cannot constitute both the
defendant and the enterprise. In other words, the state cannot prose-
cute a person under RICO for associating with himself. A Florida
court recently reviewed this issue in Wilson v. State.123 In Wilson, the
defendant's charges included one count of violating Florida's RICO
statute with the enterprise being "composed solely of appellant."1 24
The amended information charged that the defendant "Alexander
Christopher Wilson was associated with an enterprise, to-wit: Alexan-
der Christopher Wilson,. . . and that the said Alexander Christopher
Wilson ... did conduct or participate directly or indirectly, in the
affairs of the said enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity."125
The Florida court held that the defendant could not be both the
defendant and the enterprise for RICO purposes. The court ex-
plained that Florida RICO requires an "entity separate from the [defen-
dant]" in order to satisfy the enterprise element.126 Without an
"identifiable legal or de facto entity which stands apart from the asso-
ciating person," no "association" exists.127 However, the court quali-
fied its holding by reasoning that sometimes "a lone actor can be
considered an enterprise for RICO purposes when the business is dis-
tinct from the individual." 128 In this case, however, the business and
the individual defendant were alleged to be the same.
122 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
123 596 So. 2d 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
124 Id. at 776-77.
125 Id. at 780 n.4.
126 Id. at 781 (emphasis added); see also Breshnahan et al., supra note 9, at 871-73 (dis-
cussing the person-enterprise rule as it has developed in federal civil and criminal case
law).
127 Vvdson, 596 So. 2d at 781.
128 Id.
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The Wilson court outlined what is known as the "person-enter-
prise rule." The court stated that Florida RICO requires "a separate
and identifiable entity through which criminal activity is con-
ducted."1 29 This separability requirement is necessary in order to pre-
vent a state from applying RICO to individuals who merely commit a
series of crimes, and it is consistent with the Turkette and Scheidler anal-
ysis. There is no explicit requirement of separability in any of the
state RICO statutes.'30 If there were no separability requirement im-
plied in the enterprise definition, however, the scope of RICO would
be virtually boundless.' 31
2. The Effect of Separability on Sole Proprietorships
The separability analysis is also called the requirement of "dis-
tinctness" and has spilled over into cases involving sole proprietor-
ships. In another Florida case, Masonoff v. State,132 the defendant was
in the business of leasing automobile telephones. The defendant's
business checking account was in the name of "Vincent P. Masonoff
d/b/a Communication Connection." 33 The defendant's sole propri-
etorship had no employees or associates, and the defendant wrote a
series of worthless checks on the business account.
The court first held that a sole proprietorship could constitute an
enterprise for RICO purposes in Florida because it was specifically in-
cluded in the definition. 34 However, as the court explained, the
more difficult question was "whether the sole proprietorship is a suffi-
ciently separate entity from the sole proprietor, so that the sole pro-
129 Id. at 781-82. A case decided in the same district at about the same time reached
the same conclusion. SeeNapoli v. State, 596 So. 2d 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (explain-
ing that the state made no attempt to establish an association between the defendant and
another individual or entity).
130 The Wilson court rejected an older Florida opinion that allowed the individual de-
fendant to also constitute the enterprise. Wilson, 596 So. 2d at 780-81. In State v. Bowen,
413 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), review denied, 424 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1983), the court
held that RICO applied to an individual associating with himself. The court explained that
"[h] ad the legislature not intended to reach individuals such as Bowen, it could easily have
narrowed the sweep of [RICO] by supplanting 'any' with 'another'" in the definition of
enterprise. Id. at 799. Since then, Florida courts have clearly rejected the Bowen analysis.
See, e.g., Masonoff v. State, 546 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review dismissed, 553 So. 2d
1166 (Fla. 1989); State v. Nishi, 521 So. 2d 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 531 So. 2d
1355 (Fla. 1988).
131 Several other state cases, most of them from Florida courts, have also held that a
person cannot associate with himself. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 579 So. 2d 274 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (dictum); Flanagan v. State, 566 So. 2d 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Hol-
ley v. State, 564 So. 2d 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Parsley v. State, 553 So. 2d 730 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Day v. State, 541 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), review denied,
545 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1989); State v. Judd, 433 N.W.2d 260 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), review
dismissed, 439 N.W.2d 142 (Wis. 1989).
132 546 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review dismissed, 553 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1989).
133 Id. at 73. The notation "d/b/a" means "doing business as."
134 Id. at 73.
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prietor conducts or participates in the enterprise as an employee or
associate."135 The court held that because the defendant had no
other employees or associates, the defendant and the sole proprietor-
ship were in fact the same entity.'3 6 Essentially, Masonoff established
that a defendant does not create a RICO enterprise simply by operat-
ing a business under a different name. Expanding the enterprise defi-
nition to include such an entity would be tantamount to allowing a
RICO charge against an individual who associates with himself.'3 7
Some state courts have also excluded sole proprietorships from
the definition of RICO enterprises when the owner's association with
others is merely occasional. In State v. Kuklinsk, 138 a NewJersey case,
the state argued that "on occasion," the defendant "recruited others
to aid him in planning, soliciting and committing the various substan-
tive crimes."13 9 However, the indictment read that "'Richard L. Kuk-
linski, while engaged in activities which affect trade or commerce,
directly or indirectly, did conduct himself as an enterprise. '14 Not
surprisingly, the New Jersey court held that the state had not proven
the enterprise element because a person cannot associate with him-
self. Therefore, even though the defendant operated with others on
occasion without maintaining any employees, the court held that the
enterprise element was not met because for "the greater part of the
time," the defendant "conducted his alleged criminal affairs by
himself."' 41
135 Id. at 74.
136 Id. at 75. Florida is not the only state that adopts this view. In State v. Ivanhoe, 798
P.2d 410 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990), an Arizona court reached the same conclusion when it held
that "[b]ecause defendant and his sole proprietorship are the same entity in fact and law,
... the indictment failed to allege the existence of an enterprise distinct from defendant."
Id. at 412 (citation omitted).
In Ivanho4 unlike Masonoff, the defendant employed other people in his video store
business. However, the court sidestepped this argument on a definitional point because
the Arizona RICO statute, unlike the Florida statute, does not include sole proprietorships
within its scope. Id. at 412. The state also raised the issue of whether the group consti-
tuted an association in fact, but the court dismissed this argument because the state did not
charge an association in fact in the original indictment. Id. at 413. Other states that simi-
larly do not include sole proprietorships in their enterprise definitions should follow Ivan-
hoe, but if the sole proprietorship employs other people, it might still constitute a RICO
enterprise as an association in fact.
137 The Masonoffcourt left open the possibility of reaching a one-man sole proprietor-
ship if it is incorporated by the individual. Masonoff, 546 So. 2d at 75 n.1.
138 560 A.2d 1295 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
'39 Id. at 1296.
14o Id. at 1297 (emphasis added).
141 Id. at 1297. In a recent civil case on a related, but different, issue, a New Jersey
court held that a plaintiff can name both the enterprise and various individual members of
that enterprise as defendants because NewJersey's "broader definition of 'person' elimi-
nates the [federal] distinctiveness rule for an action under New Jersey RICO." Maxim
Sewerage Corp. v. Monmouth Ridings, 640 A.2d 1216, 1221 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1993).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
With narrowly defined exceptions, the rule is universal in state
RICO that a person cannot constitute both the defendant and the
enterprise. This rule of distinctness or separability is necessary in or-
der to avoid applying state RICO to an individual who merely commits
a series of crimes without assistance or associates. Further, a sole pro-
prietorship without other employees cannot constitute an enterprise
because the defendant and the sole proprietorship are the same en-
tity. At least in New Jersey, a sole proprietorship also cannot consti-
tute a RICO enterprise if the defendant merely associates with others
"on occasion," 42 though it remains unclear what level of associative
activity converts such a business into a RICO enterprise.
C. Legal Entities as RICO Enterprises
State RICO statutes also apply to legal entities other than sole
proprietorships. As the cases below will demonstrate, the prosecutor's
proof of a RICO enterprise becomes relatively easy when there exists a
legal entity through which the criminal defendant conducts illegal ac-
tivities. These legal entities can take many forms, but all of them can
constitute enterprises under state RICO statutes.
A classic case of a state prosecutor's appropriate use of a state
RICO statute against white-collar crime is the recent Georgia Court of
Appeals decision in Thompson v. State.143 In Thompson, four defend-
ants were charged with violating Georgia's RICO statute by con-
ducting a scheme through an "assumption business" called Southern
Financial Services (SFS).144 The defendants acquired vehicles from
people who were having trouble making their payments, assumed re-
sponsibility for the payments, and resold the vehicles to "buyers" with
the money ostensibly going to the lienholders. Instead, the
lienholder, whom the defendants never paid, 145 repossessed the vehi-
cles, while the defendants kept and divided the money. Ajoint-ven-
ture, limited-partnership agreement established the assumption
business, which the defendants used as a deposit for the cash "buyers"
and from which defendants would draw and divide the balance.146
After their convictions, two of the defendants appealed, alleging
various errors including that "they did not have the requisite knowl-
edge of the criminal element of 'enterprise' to sustain their RICO
conviction."' 47 The court rejected the argument because RICO does
not require that each defendant have full knowledge of all of the fac-
142 Kuklinski, 560 A.2d at 1296.
143 440 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. Ct. App.), cet. denied, (Ga. Mar. 25, 1994).
144 Id. at 671.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 673.
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ets of the enterprise and all of its members. 148 The court explained
that "[a]n 'enterprise' is not a criminal act in itself; it is a description
of the entities involved in the RICO violations." 149 ,
This case presents a paradigmatic white-collar criminal business
organization that state RICO statutes are particularly adept at address-
ing. RICO allows the prosecutor to consolidate the charge into a sin-
gle count and thus avoid the expense, time, and risk of confusion that
would result if the prosecutor had to charge and prosecute these de-
fendants with every predicate act they committed.150 In Thompson, the
prosecutor charged each defendant with a RICO violation as well as
fifty-four counts of various types of theft.151 Even when both RICO
and the predicate acts are charged, however, RICO allows the prose-
cutor and the jury to view the entire picture of the organized pattern
of racketeering activity that the state has chosen to make an independ-
ent crime.
An interesting case ofjudicial creativity with the enterprise defini-
tion is the Indiana decision Kahn v. State.152 The defendant formed a
corporation, sold stock to investors for $1,465,200, but only had gross
sales of $2,429. At the same time, Kahn paid himself a salary of
$489,545.153 The prosecutor brought RICO charges based on various
counts of securities fraud, but encountered difficulties because the In-
diana enterprise definition did not include corporation at the time. 54
148 Id. at 673.
149 Id. at 673.
Another case involving a small business is Commonwealth v. Yacoubian, 489 A.2d 228
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). In Yacoubian, the defendant owned a dry cleaning establishment
that was used as a front to sell drugs and store stolen property from his burglary ring. Id. at
231-32. The court found the evidence sufficient to affirm the guilty verdict on the RICO
count, but remanded for a second determination of the amount of fines that the trial court
imposed. Id. at 235.
150 Many cases involving organized white-collar criminal activity, however, will be un-
avoidably complex and confusing. In People v. Capaldo, 572 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup. Ct. 1991),
eight defendants were charged with conducting a criminal enterprise "to control and cor-
rupt the affairs of District Council No. 9 of the International Brotherhood of Painters and
Allied Trades," a group of union officials. Each defendant had a personal defense attor-
ney, and the indictment contained 153 counts. The court, noting that New York's RICO
statute was intended to be narrower and more precise than federal RICO, held that the
statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 992.
151 Thompson, 440 S.E.2d at 671.
152 493 N.E.2d 790 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
153 Id. at 793.
154 "Corporation" was added by amendment in 1984, after the defendant had formed
his corporation. Id. at 798. The version of the RICO statute in effect at the time of the
offense defined enterprise as a:
(1) sole proprietorship, partnership, business trust, or governmental entity,
or
(2) union, association, or group, whether a legal entity or merely associated
in fact.
IND. Cona § 35-45-6-1(b) (Supp. 1981) (amended 1984), construed in 493 N.E.2d at 797-98.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Nevertheless, the Indiana Court of Appeals had no trouble reading
the definition expansively. Citing Webster's Third New International Dic-
tionary, the court argued that the definition of "group" would "cer-
tainly... apply to a corporation."'155 The court reasoned that "the
Legislature's original intent in defining 'enterprise' was to include
every sort of group or association within that definition."1 56 There-
fore, the Indiana court took a generous view of the enterprise defini-
tion and was willing to broaden its scope beyond the literal terms of
the definition.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a much less expansive
reading in Commonwealth v. Bobitski.157 In Bobitski, the defendant was
an employee of Thrift Drug and responsible for soliciting bids and
awarding construction contracts.' 58 Using his position at Thrift Drug,
the defendant also solicited bribes from various contractors over a pe-
riod of six years. Although Thrift Drug's managers were not involved
in Bobitski's scheme and the defendant was the only one who benefit-
ted, the defendant could not have solicited bribes without the position
he held in that company.
The court framed the issue as whether Pennsylvania's RICO stat-
ute applied to "an individual who committed a series of criminal acts
for his own benefit while employed by a legitimate enterprise." 159 In-
stead of focusing on the language of the enterprise definition, the
court looked for guidance in the statute's preamble, entitled "Find-
ings of Fact."160 From this preamble, the court divined that "[t]he
express intent [of the legislature] was to prevent infiltration of legiti-
mate businesses by organized crime." 161 That argument enabled the
court to differentiate "organized crime" from the "organized crimi-
nal"' 62 and to conclude that Pennsylvania's RICO statute did not
cover the latter. The court then affirmed the quashing of the RICO
count by the Court of Common Pleas.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court incorrectly relied on the legis-
lature's preamble in interpreting the statute's enterprise definition
which, standing alone, is similar to other states' enterprise defini-
tions.165 As a result of its skewed perspective, the court limited an
'55 Kahn, 493 N.E.2d at 798.
156 Id.
157 632 A.2d 1294 (Pa. 1993).
158 Id. at 1295.
159 Id.
160 The preamble, in short, speaks repeatedly of "organized crime" and its "infiltration
and corruption" of legitimate businesses. The entire preamble can be found in the Bobitski
decision. Id. at 1296.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Pennsylvania's RICO defines "enterprise" to mean "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associ-
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otherwise expansive enterprise definition to mean simply and exclu-
sively organized crime. However, the defendant in Bobitski is the very
type of white-collar criminal that most threatens the reputation and
credibility of legitimate businesses and provides the perfect target for
state RICO statutes. Such criminals are sufficiently small-scale to avoid
a federal prosecution, but have committed enough crimes over a pe-
riod of time (six years in Bobitski) that state prosecutors would benefit
from the ability to utilize a RICO charge. 64 Even though Bobitski
acted alone and was the sole beneficiary of his crimes, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court should have allowed prosecutors to use RICO
against this criminal who used a legitimate business enterprise to en-
gage in a pattern of racketeering activity.
D. Associations in Fact
Associations in fact are the most difficult type of enterprise to
define and have caused state courts to develop special methods for
their identification. 165 State RICO enterprise definitions list associa-
tions in fact alongside partnerships, corporations, and unions without
comment. Nevertheless, many state courts have followed the lead of
federal courts in adding requirements for proof of associations in fact
that do not appear in the language of the statutes. These include re-
quirements of continuity, structure, and common purpose, but courts
mix and match requirements depending on whether they intend to
interpret the state RICO statute broadly or narrowly.166
ated in fact although not a legal entity, engaged in commerce." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 911(h)(3) (West 1983).
164 A contrast should be made here between Bobitski's conduct and the criminal con-
duct of an employee who embezzles funds from his employer. In the latter case, the crimi-
nal employee should not be prosecuted under RICO because the individual is acting alone
and taking advantage of his position as an employee, but the enterprise itself is still a
legitimate business that has not been "infiltrated" by the criminal element. Bobitski's con-
duct, on the other hand, amounted to taking advantage of his position to conduct his
criminal business through the enterprise to the general public. Therefore, Bobitski infil-
trated a legitimate enterprise, making the enterprise more susceptible to criminal corruption.
Given the court's findings regarding the legislature's intent, Bobitski's criminal conduct
should have satisfied the court's standard. Instead, the court defined the legislature's in-
tent to prevent "infiltration of legitimate businesses," then proceeded to ignore that inten-
tion in deciding the actual case.
165 One commentator noted that associations in fact "are more difficult to analyze
because the nexus between the individual defendants, their crimes, and their organization
is often amorphous; legal concepts such as chains, spokes, wheels, and rims creep into
view." Coffey, supra note 6, at 1046 n.55.
166 In People v. Cerrone, 867 P.2d 143 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd on other grounds, 900
P.2d 45 (Colo. 1995), the Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed the defendant's RICO con-
viction for managing a prostitution ring. Rather than mixing and matching requirements
for finding the association in fact, the court held that "the enterprise need not be separate
and distinct from the racketeering activity." Id. at 149. The court also held that the Colo-
rado RICO statute "does not require that the 'enterprise' and 'person' engaged in racke-
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Two cases with similar facts in different states illustrate how differ-
ent courts approach an alleged association in fact with different meth-
ods of judicial analysis and reach opposite results: Boyd v. State167 in
Florida and State v. Cheek168 in Oregon.
1. The Florida Case
In Boyd, the defendant was charged with multiple crimes commit-
ted during a two-week crime spree with three other teenagers. 169
Among, others, the crimes included multiple armed robberies and
auto theft. After the defendant tried to run down a police officer, the
officer shot and killed one of the teenagers in the fleeing automobile.
The defendant was charged with individual counts as well as a RICO
violation, and the trial court denied a pre-trial motion to dismiss the
RICO count.
The defendant appealed, arguing that this loose band of
criminals did not constitute a RICO enterprise. Looking to the fed-
eral courts for guidance, the Florida Court of Appeals explained that
"in enacting the RICO statute, Congress did not intend to use RICO
to prosecute criminals who merely get together to commit sporadic
acts of crime." 70 In order to establish an association in fact, the court
explained, the state must prove the existence of "an ongoing organiza-
tion, formal or informal, with various associates who function as a con-
tinuing unit."1'7 Therefore, the court required the state to prove
structure, continuity, and an existence separate from the pattern of
crimes that the defendant actually committed. 7 2
teering activity be different entities." Id. As the cases below illustrate, most courts impose
at least some factors to guide their findings of associations in fact.
167 578 So. 2d 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 581 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1991).
168 786 P.2d 1305 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 794 P.2d 793 (Or. 1990).
169 Boyd, 578 So. 2d at 719-20.
170 Id. at 720 (observing that the Florida RICO statute is patterned after the federal
statute).
171 Id. at 721. The next year, the Florida District Court of Appeal reaffirmed this test
for finding associations in fact. State v. Russell, 611 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
The defendant was involved in a drug ring, but there was "no evidence of an identifiable
decision making structure for directing the group as a whole." Id. at 1267. The only evi-
dence of an enterprise "consisted of recorded telephone conversations between [defen-
dant] and one of the other defendants which only indicated buy/sell transactions between
those two." Id. This was not enough.
172 This requires the state to prove an "ongoing, structured, criminal association." 578
So. 2d at 721. The members of the enterprise must also be connected by more than the
commission of the predicate acts. Id. at 722. This second point follows the analysis that
the Court set forth in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
In Commonwealth v. Donahue, 630 A.2d 1238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), appeal denied, 645
A.2d 1316 (Pa. 1994), the court developed a similarly high standard. The court held that
"in order to sustain a conviction for corrupt organizations, the Commonwealth must prove
that there was an ongoing organization engaged in commerce and that the associates of
the organization functioned as a continuing unit." Id. at 1245. Though the court did not
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The court found that the state failed to meet any of these three
requirements. First, the state presented no evidence showing "an
identifiable decision-making and control mechanism" within the
group of teenagers.' 73 Instead, the crimes were sporadic, haphazard,
and disorganized; as a result, the court concluded that "the minimal
association of these teenagers lacked sufficient structure to constitute
an enterprise."' 74 Second, the evidence failed to meet the continuity
requirement because the crime spree was "sporadic," had a "short du-
ration," and lacked the characteristic of "a continuing threat."175 Fi-
nally, the evidence failed to connect the four teenagers in any way
except by the commission of the particular crimes. The court ex-
plained that there must be "proof, minimally, of a purposive system-
atic arrangement between members of the group." 176 This
arrangement was nothing more than a group of unconnected adoles-
cents committing a series of crimes in a short period of time.
The court correctly concluded that these teenagers, who "alterna-
tively look[ed] for ways to obtain fast money by force or threat of
force, and committ[ed] random acts of violence toward that end,"
were not the type of criminals that should be subjected to "the height-
ened punishment of RICO."1' 77 The Florida court signaled its inten-
tion to heighten the standards of proof for associations in fact to
require a certain degree of structure and planning that typify the con-
ditions found in enterprise criminality. The distinction is one be-
tween organized and disorganized group criminality. What makes the
former type eligible for RICO prosecution is the planning, organiza-
tion, and structure that the legislature proscribes with enhanced
forms of punishment.
2. The Oregon Case
In State v. Cheek, the Oregon court adopted a lower standard of
proof for associations in fact, but the particular association in Cheek
probably would have satisfied the elements of structure and continuity
the Florida courts require as well. The defendant in Cheek was
charged with directing a group of young men to commit a wide variety
of crimes including theft, arson, and false claims against insurance
companies over a period of about five years.178 The court framed the
explicitly require structure, such a requirement can probably be inferred from the lan-
guage of the standard.
173 Boyd, 578 So. 2d at 722.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 722-23.
178 State v. Cheek, 786 P.2d 1305, 1306 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 794 P.2d 793 (Or.
1990).
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issue as "what constitutes an enterprise under ORICO [the Oregon
RICO statute] when the alleged enterprise is carried on by an individ-
ual."'179 The defendant, following the Boyd reasoning, argued that an
enterprise must have an "ascertainable structure," a "common or
shared purpose," and "[function] as a continuing unit." 80
The Oregon Court of Appeals followed the defendant's standard
in part, but applied it in a looser fashion. The court required that
there be "some connection between an individual and an organiza-
tion" to meet the enterprise requirement.' 8 ' However, the court ex-
plained that "[i]t is apparent that the legislature wanted to include
every kind of enterprise within the definition."18 2 Therefore, the Ore-
gon court adopted the standard that the state "must include proof of
an on-going organization, however loose, that is distinct from the
commission of separate criminal acts by an individual." 83 This stan-
There are several instructive state court cases in which the defendants were members
of relatively loose criminal rings. See Koger v. State, 513 N.E.2d 1250 (Ind. C. App. 1987)
(affirming conviction of defendant involved in a burglary ring when one predicate act was
conspiracy and the other predicate act was the theft underlying the conspiracy); Common-
wealth v. Murphy, 613 A.2d 1215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (explaining that defendant was the
leader of a group engaged in a lucrative, organized and ongoing narcotics trade, for which
numerous people worked); State v. Porto, 591 A.2d 791 (R.I. 1991) (reversing a conviction
involving participation in a stolen car ring and requiring that defendant agree to become a
member of the enterprise); Renfro v. State, 827 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (applying
the Texas gang statute which requires the defendant to both agree to participate in the
group and to perform an overt act in pursuance of that agreement); Humphrey v. State,
626 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (reversing conviction on the sole ground that two of
the five requisite members of the organization were undercover agents).
179 Cheek, 786 P.2d at 1306. Though the court discussed the issue as if the enterprise
were an individual, the court analyzed the issue as if the enterprise were an association in
fact.
180 Id. at 1306-07.
181 Id. at 1307.
182 Id. In a case with a tangentially related issue, the Georgia Court of Appeals held
that prosecutors only needed to charge an association in fact, without explaining its na-
ture, to satisfy the indictment requirement alleging the enterprise element of RICO.
Drewry v. State, 411 S.E.2d 898, 900 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
183 Cheek, 786 P.2d at 1307.
In State v. O'Connell, 508 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. Ct. App.), review denied, 513 N.W.2d 405
(Wis. 1993), the court reviewed the conviction of two defendants who constituted the
RICO enterprise. The two defendants lived together and bought and sold antiques to-
gether. Finding an enterprise, the court held that "[the business needs no infrastructure
to be an 'enterprise.' Nor does the statute require that the organization have a trade
name." Id. at 26.
In Martin v. State, 376 S.E.2d 888 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989), the court was similarly inclined
not to require much structure to find a RICO enterprise. The court held that "enterprise"
can include informal criminal networks engaged in racketeering activity, that the state is
not required to prove that all members of the enterprise knew of each others' existence,
and that there need not be an ascertainable structure. Id. at 893.
In People v. Wakefield Financial Corp., 590 N.Y.S.2d 382 (Sup. Ct. 1992), the court
held that members of the enterprise could come and go so long as the purpose of the
group remained constant and that the prosecution did not need to prove a management
structure "so rigid as to resemble the formalistic corporate flow chart." Id. at 389.
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dard clearly reaches a broader range of enterprises than the Florida
court was willing to cover. Consequently, the Cheek court concluded
that because the defendant chose the site of the crimes, planned their
commission, instructed the young men on how to commit them, and
provided the means to commit them, he acted through an enterprise
reachable by the Oregon RICO statute.' 8 4
An interesting facet of the Cheek decision is that all three judges
authored opinions. The specially concurring judge advocated a
broader standard while the dissenting judge advocated a narrower
one. The concurring judge argued that "it is not necessary for the
state to prove an ongoing organization in order to establish the exis-
tence of an enterprise."'8 5 Recognizing the broad scope of this state-
ment, the judge explained that "[a]lthough it is possible that ORICO,
as I read it, might permit the conviction of an individual recidivist, the
plain meaning of the word 'individual' in the statute suggests that the
possibility was within the contemplation of the legislature when it en-
acted this crime-fighting tool."18 6 This interpretation far exceeds that
of the Florida court, or of any other state court's interpretation for
that matter. It would expand RICO's reach to almost limitless bounds
and would go beyond the already liberal reading the majority in this
case adopted.' 87
The dissenting judge urged the court to require proof of organ-
ized criminal activity manifesting a "connection with an organization"
in order to cross the RICO threshold from merely a "series of standard
184 Cheek, 786 P.2d at 1307.
185 Id. at 1308 (Riggs, J., specially concurring).
186 Id. at 1309 (Riggs, J., specially concurring).
187 Other broad interpretations with seemingly limitless bounds can be found in cases
willing to infer the existence of an association in fact from the pattern of racketeering
activity in which a group engages. In State v. Hill, No. CA-8094, 1990 WL 237485, at *3
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990), review dismissed, 574 N.E.2d 1083 (Ohio 1991), the court held that
"[t]he network or enterprise need not be explicit as long as its existence can plausibly be
inferred from the interdependence of activities and persons involved."
A similar case is State v. Wynne, 767 P.2d 373 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 767
P.2d 354 (N.M. 1989). The Wynne court explained that a RICO enterprise could exist even
absent association above and beyond the acts forming the pattern of racketeering activity.
Id. at 376. These cases define the outer boundaries of permissible grounds on which to
find a RICO enterprise.
A case indicating agreement, but not following the strong holding of inferring the
enterprise solely from the pattern of racketeering activity is People v. Cantarella, 606
N.Y.S.2d 942 (Sup. Ct. 1993). In Cantarella, the court explained that some structure must
be proven and that "the structure of the enterprise must be greater than the sum of the
roles played by its members. . ., but the scope of the enterprise may be defined by the
pattern of its criminal activity." Id. at 947.
But see State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 (Utah 1988), in which the court held that "the
Government must prove both the existence of an 'enterprise' and the connected 'pattern
of racketeering activity.'... While the proof used to establish these separate elements may
in particular cases coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily establish the other." Id. at
637 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)).
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crimes."'188 The dissent recognized that the statute is limitless if
"[t] aken by itself," but argued that in order to give effect to legislative
intent, the trial court should have accepted the defendant's statement
of the law.189 Nevertheless, the dissenting judge believed that
"[t] here was evidence to support a conviction" under the defendant's
statement of the standard.190 Therefore, though all three judges
agreed that RICO could reach the defendant's conduct, they all dis-
agreed on the proper standard that the state must meet to satisfy the
enterprise requirement.
3. The Lines Drawn by the Minnesota Supreme Court
The decisions in Boyd and Cheek illustrate the different types of
analysis that can develop in different states regarding the proof re-
quired for an association in fact. However, analytical conflicts do not
always occur in different states; they can occur in the same state as
well. Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided two cases in
order to establish a standard for determining the existence of an asso-
ciation in fact. One decision, State v. Huynh,'91 affinned a RICO con-
viction, while the other decision, State v. Kelly,' 92 reversed a RICO
conviction. The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed these cases on
the same day in an attempt to illustrate both sides of the RICO enter-
prise fence.193
In Huynh, the defendant and three other men repeatedly de-
manded money from a local Vietnamese restaurant owner for "protec-
tion.' 94 The victim received numerous phone calls threatening that
if he did not make the payments, the "gang" would kill him and his
family. Upon receiving checks and money orders from the victim, the
defendant forwarded them to a man named Trong who deposited
them in a Texas bank.195 The defendant was convicted of five counts
of coercion and one count of racketeering under Minnesota's RICO
statute.
The Minnesota Supreme Court discussed Turkette and another
federal RICO case that imposed a distinct structure requirement,
United States v. Bledsoe.196 Prosecutors argued that such a requirement
188 Cheek 786 P.2d at 1309 (Graber, PJ., dissenting).
189 Id. at 1309, 1311 (Graber, P.J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 1311.
191 519 N.W.2d 191 (Minn. 1994) (en banc).
192 519 N.W.2d 202 (Minn. 1994) (en banc).
193 Id. at 202.
194 Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 197.
195 Id. at 192-93.
196 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982). The facts in Bledsoe are
irrelevant to the discussion here. The Bledsoe court held, however, that "the enterprise
element requires proof of some structure separate from the racketeering activity." Id. at
664.
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is inappropriate for proof of an association in fact because the facts
used to prove the pattern of racketeering element will often be the
same facts required to prove the criminal enterprise. The court noted
that the commission of criminal acts always involves some organiza-
tion by the participants, but rejected the state's argument, explaining
that "[i]f this minimal cooperative effort is all that is required for the
existence of an enterprise, then the RICO offense collapses into noth-
ing more than the enhanced punishment of recidivists."' 97 Instead,
the Huynh court established a three-part test for proving an associa-
tion in fact:
(1) a common purpose among the individuals associated with the
enterprise; where
(2) the organization is ongoing and continuing, with its members
functioning under some sort of decisionmaking arrangement or
structure; and where
(8) the activities of the organization extend beyond the commis-
sion of the underlying criminal acts either to coordinate the under-
lying criminal acts into a pattern of criminal activity or to engage in
other activities. 198
Applying this test to the facts in Huynh, the court determined that
the defendant had conceded that he and his associates shared a com-
mon purpose. Second, the court reasoned that to be "ongoing and
continuing," there had to be "some continuity of structure and per-
sonnel."'199 The activities in Huynh met this requirement because the
scheme lasted for six months, included a regular payment schedule,
and was sufficiently organized to impose discipline which was indi-
cated at trial when one of the gang's members exhibited conveniently
faulty memory. Finally, although the court considered the third
prong as the "closest question," it was satisfied that the evidence met
the final requirement for an association in fact.200 Because the organ-
ization did not merely engage in extortion-the alleged pattern of
racketeering activity-but also money laundering in another state, the
third prong was met.201 Even though the money laundering was done
197 Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 195.
198 Id. at 196. The court added that these three prongs should henceforth be added to
jury instructions in RICO cases, in addition to the statutory language itself. Id. at 197.
Interestingly enough, the court chose not to use the term "distinct structure," opting in-
stead for a looser requirement akin to the "separability" variation discussed in Cheek. See
supra part III.D.2.
199 Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 197.
200 Id.
201 At this point in the analysis, a dissenting justice (joined by one other justice) de-
parted company with the majority. The dissenters would have required the state to prove,
as the third prong, the existence of "'an ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in
the conduct of a pattern of racketeering activity.'" Id. at 199 (Gardebring, J., dissenting)
(quoting U.S. v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 855 (8th Cir. 1987)) (emphasis added). Instead,
the majority merely required the state to prove that "'the activities of the organization ex-
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in furtherance of the extortion, those acts were "not necessary to the
commission of the underlying criminal acts."202
In Kelly, the other Minnesota case, the defendant was convicted of
offenses related to his organization and coordination of a prostitution
ring involving as many as five juvenile girls.20 3 For nineteen months,
the defendant promoted prostitution using the five juveniles who
worked for him at different periods of time, ranging in length from
three weeks to only a day or so. 20 4 Applying its newly developed test,
the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that this operation did not
constitute an association in fact for RICO purposes.20 5 The court
found that the defendant and the juveniles had a common purpose:
to engage in prostitution activity.206 However, the court questioned
whether this "episodic association" met the second requirement of an
"ongoing" organization. 20 7 Because the juveniles came and went over
the nineteen months, the court doubted that there was any "con-
tinuity of personnel" sufficient to meet the second prong.20 8 Finally,
the court held that the third prong was not met because the defen-
dant did not engage in any activity that was not "inherent in the predi-
cate criminal acts of ... promoting prostitution."20 9
The test the Minnesota Supreme Court developed occupies a
middle ground between the heightened structural elements the Flor-
ida courts required and the flexible elements the Oregon courts re-
tend beyond... the underlying criminal acts.' " Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 196. The dissent
viewed the majority's focus on an analysis of activities to find an association in fact as inher-
endy flawed and certain to lead to confusion in the lower courts. The dissent, following
the Boyd analysis, focused on the structure of the enterprise itself to determine its exis-
tence. Because these cases are recent, their impact has yet to be felt.
202 Id. at 197.
208 Kelly, 519 N.W.2d at 202-03.
204 Id. at 204. The state alleged an association in fact either between the defendant
and his fellow pimps (there were two others), or the defendant and the juvenile
prostitutes.
205 Note the common features between the Kelly facts and the facts of State v. Cheek,
786 P.2d 1305 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 794 P.2d 793 (Or. 1990). Both cases involved
loose bands of criminals who took orders from a single ringleader. The only significant
difference was the varying length of time each member was in the "gang" in Kelly. In Cheek,
the juveniles the defendant "employed" were regularly involved from beginning to end.
206 Two Pennsylvania cases also emphasized the "purpose" element of an association in
fact. In Commonwealth v. Dennis, 618 A.2d 972 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), the court held that
the prosecution had satisfactorily proven that the defendant was engaged with others in
transactions leading to the ultimate common goal of distributing methamphetamine. Id.
at 976.
The case of Commonwealth v. Besch, 614 A.2d 1155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), also dealt
with the defendant's involvement in a drug ring. The court held that the "enterprise"
definition included the defendant's purposeful participation in the illegitimate business of
delivering controlled substances. Id. at 1157.
207 Kelly, 519 N.W.2d at 205.
208 Id.
209 Id. The two dissenting judges in Huynh concurred in the Kelly result, but again
disagreed over the third prong of the majority's test.
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quired, though the Minnesota analysis is closer in form to the Florida
analysis. While the Florida court's analysis, as discussed above, clearly
differentiates between organized and unorganized associations, the
Minnesota court's analysis merely requires proof of a common pur-
pose and places greater emphasis on the association's activities as they
relate to the underlying pattern of criminal acts.2 10 Although Kelly's
prostitution ring was organized in the ordinary sense of the term, it
failed Minnesota's third prong because its activities did not extend
beyond the promotion of prostitution. This, however, does not mean
that Minnesota requires a higher standard than Florida. While is possi-
ble that Huynh would have satisfied Florida's structural requirements,
Kelly would probably have not, because in Kelly there was no direct
evidence that planning or collaboration activity occurred within the
group.2 1' The Minnesota Supreme Court chose to focus the inquiry
in cases charging an association in fact on the extent of the activities
of the association rather than create a strict structural requirement.2 12
The Minnesota Supreme Court also required a certain "con-
tinuity of... personnel,"2 13 not merely a continuity of structure and
210 A New Mexico Court of Appeals appeared to adopt the language of the Florida
court's standard, but refused to apply it rigidly, choosing instead to enumerate factors
relevant to analysis. In State v. Hughes, 767 P.2d 382 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988), the court
required "(1) a common purpose among the participants, (2) organization, and (3) con-
tinuity" in order to prove a RICO association in fact. Id. at 389. The court explained,
though, that these elements could be satisfied through a balanced analysis of relevant fac-
tors, including "the identity of the individuals involved, their knowledge of the relevant
activities, the amount of planning required to carry out the predicate acts, the frequency of
the acts, the time span between each act, and the existence of an identifiable structure
within the association or entity." Id. Thus, rather than a rigid approach, this method of
analysis allows the reviewing court a high degree of flexibility to adjust the analysis in light
of the state RICO policies and specific facts in a particular case.
211 In Huynh, the state did not have evidence indicating that the defendant engaged in
planning and collaboration activity with the Texas contact. Such evidence might well have
existed and such planning activity might well have occurred, but the Minnesota Supreme
Court, unlike the Florida court in Boyd, did not deem it necessary for a conviction.
212 It might appear that Minnesota adopts the same test as Florida. However, though
the courts use many of the same phrases, the real test of the degree of scrutiny given to
associations in fact is how courts apply those phrases in particular cases. The dissents in
Huynh demonstrate that some members of the Minnesota Supreme Court were not satis-
fied with the structure requirement, arguing that it should be stronger. In voicing their
objections to the third prong of the Minnesota test, the dissenters in Huynh and Kelly ad-
vanced an approach that is closer to that adopted by the Florida courts. Minnesota clearly
rejected the "distinct structure" requirement that analysis in a Florida court would
mandate.
Perhaps the Minnesota Supreme Court felt that the second prong, requiring an
"ongoing and continuous" association with "its members functioning under some sort of
decisionmaking arrangement or structure," sufficieritly addressed the structural require-
ments for associations in fact. In Huynh, the state had evidence that the defendant oper-
ated in conjunction with a number of unnamed associates who waited in the car while the
defendant collected the payments. This evidence was sufficient to satisfy the second. 519
N.W.2d at 197.
213 Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 197.
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organization. Some states do not require continuity of personnel, al-
lowing individuals to come and go in an association in fact without
disqualifying that association as the RICO enterprise.214 However,
Minnesota rejected Florida's strict distinct structure requirement, ex-
plaining that if the purpose of the "'distinct structure' requirement is
to avoid casting too wide a net and catching the unorganized criminal,
then ... the definition of 'pattern of criminal activity' spelled out in
our state's RICO Act ... accomplishes this purpose."215 Therefore,
although the Minnesota court recognized the importance of prevent-
ing RICO's application to unorganized crime, it did not believe that
restricting the enterprise definition was necessarily the best way to do
it. For associations in fact, state courts have developed various factors
required for their proof, but the Minnesota Supreme Court has also
wisely looked to the pattern of racketeering element to circumscribe
the limits of RICO's applications. 21 6
4. New Jersey's Flexible Approach
Not every state has chosen to follow the Florida approach to as-
sociations in fact. NewJersey courts, among others, following the lead
of the Oregon Court of Appeals in Cheek, have chosen to interpret
enterprise liberally. In a relatively recent landmark case, State v.
Bal 217 six defendants were convicted of various crimes relating to an
elaborate scheme to locate and lease illegal dumping sites in New
Jersey for garbage from New York. Bribes were paid, illegal licenses
were issued, and garbage was dumped over a period of approximately
one year, despite an ongoing investigation of the entire operation by
local authorities.
In reviewing the convictions, the New Jersey Appellate Court de-
veloped an approach for determining whether the enterprise element
of the NewJersey RICO statute had been met. In this case, the alleged
primary purpose of the association in fact was "the unlawful disposal
of out-of-state solid waste within NewJersey for the members and asso-
ciates of the enterprise. '218 The defendants argued that their "short-
lived, informal, relationship or incidental association did not consti-
tute a separate ongoing highly structured organization apart from
their criminal activity."219 The New Jersey court, however, rejected
such a strict analysis of the enterprise element. After discussing fed-
214 See, e.g., Martin v. State, 376 S.E.2d 888 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Cheek, 786
P.2d 1305 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 794 P.2d 793 (Or. 1990).
215 Huynh, 519 N.W.2d at 196.
216 See infra part IV.B.2 for a discussion of how to limit RICO's scope without altering
the "enterprise" definition.
217 632 A.2d 1222 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
218 Id. at 1234.
219 Id. at 1235.
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eral circuits that had taken the "broadest approach," the court agreed
with the New Jersey trial court's analysis, explaining that "[t]he New
Jersey Statute is broadly drawn, arguably even more broadly drawn
than the Federal Statute."220 Therefore, the court reasoned, "[t]aking
the restrictive interpretations advanced by some Federal Courts would
fly in the face of [the] New Jersey legislative intent and would erode
the beneficial purposes of the New Jersey Statute."22 1
Following the reasoning of the Oregon courts, the New Jersey
court explained:
Imposing a requirement that there be evidence of a strict and ascer-
tainable underlying structure, and limiting the scope of a RICO en-
terprise to groups that serve a function beyond that which is
necessary for commission of the predicate racketeering offenses,
would erode the enlarged, and we believe intended, purposes of
New Jersey RICO and frustrate the very purpose for which it was
enacted ... Therefore .... all that is required to satisfy the New
Jersey RICO enterprise element is a group of people, however loosely
associated, whose existence provides the common purpose of commit-
ting two or more predicate acts.22 2
In this case, however, in which the defendants were a "disorganized
group" with "no real 'leader,"' a RICO charge was appropriate be-
cause the defendants "should not be allowed to escape harsher RICO
penalties simply because they lacked the management skills or ambi-
tion to raise the group to a higher and more organized realm of crimi-
nality."223 In a clear departure from the Florida and Minnesota
analysis, the court concluded:
We go so far as to hold the "enterprise" element is satisfied if the
"enterprise" is no more than the sum of the racketeering acts.
Thus, the "enterprise" does not have to be an organization whose
purpose is greater than the predicate acts, nor does it have to evi-
dence any definable structure.224
The NewJersey court unequivocally indicated its intention to de-
fer to the legislative branch and prosecutorial discretion in determin-
220 Id. at 1239.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 1240 (emphasis added). Later in the opinion, the majority looked specifically
to the Oregon courts for guidance in the interpretation of NewJersey's RICO statute. Id.
at 1258.
The court explained that the "common purpose" requirement was met in this case
because "[i]t is [the defendants'] unlawful participation in the enterprise which provides
evidence that defendants' association was more than merely incidental, and which justifies
prosecution under RICO." Id. at 1244. Therefore, reflecting the court's flexible approach
to the enterprise element, the "common purpose" requirement is proven by a minimal
evidentiary showing of participation in the association in fact.
223 Id. at 1240.
224 Id. at 1259.
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ing the kinds of criminal associations that could be prosecuted under
New Jersey's RICO statute. Like the Oregon Court of Appeals, the
NewJersey court recognized that associations in fact can exist in many
forms and combinations, and that the judiciary should not restrict the
reach of the language of the enterprise definition.
5. Interpretive Methodologies for Associations in Fact
Because associations in fact are not easily identifiable legal enti-
ties, it is not surprising that state courts determine their existence in
different ways. State courts in Florida and, to a less exacting extent,
Minnesota, have imposed three-prong tests that must be met in order
to establish an association in fact enterprise for RICO purposes.
These tests restrict the scope of the application of RICO by limiting
the definition of enterprise, but cases like Huynh demonstrate that
many relatively informal criminal associations can still be prosecuted
under RICO in these states. State courts in Oregon and New Jersey
reject the three-prong tests and prefer to give the enterprise defini-
tion its broadest reading by allowing any association in fact, however
loose the organization, to qualify as a RICO enterprise. Sensitive to
their limited judicial role, these courts defer to the state legislatures
rather than limit RICO's scope about evidence of contrary legislative
intent, and look to other elements of the statute to limit its applica-
tion, namely the pattern of racketeering requirement.
IV
THE FUTURE
The previous Parts demonstrated the various constructions that
state legislatures have given the enterprise definitions of state RICO
statutes and the diverse methodologies that state courts have adopted
to interpret them. Though most states originally patterned their
RICO enterprise definitions after the federal RICO statute, state
RICO prosecutions have increased sufficiently to warrant an in-
dependent assessment of their scope and usefulness for state prosecu-
tors. This Part surveys the future of state RICO, responds to its critics,
and suggests methods for restricting the scope of state RICO prosecu-
tions without altering the enterprise definition.
A. Looking Ahead: How to Interpret Enterprise
Most states have adopted a broad definition of enterprise for
RICO purposes, and some states have added the open-ended word
includes in order to allow courts flexibility in interpreting the statutes.
Courts in states that have not limited their RICO statutes to particular
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forms of criminal activity (as Texas and Iowa did) 225 should accept the
legislature's invitation for a flexible analysis when interpreting the en-
terprise definition. When the state legislatures have demonstrated an
intent through the language of the statute to allow RICO to reach all
types of criminal enterprises, courts should not impose additional re-
quirements of their own on a RICO prosecution.2 26 The most effec-
tive method of restricting RICO's scope while maintaining fidelity to
the goals of the statute227 is to limit the types of criminal activity that
count as predicate acts for the purpose of proving the pattern of rack-
eteering activity requirement. Given the many and various forms in
which racketeering" criminality can exist, however, it is unwise to limit
the enterprise element in any way that might compromise its
effectiveness.
Associations in fact, however, present problems of interpretation
that other types of RICO enterprise do not. It is difficult for courts
and prosecutors to determine what constitutes an association in fact
without some legal guidance. Oregon and New Jersey allow many
loose associations to constitute RICO enterprises. 228 Florida and Min-
nesota have more narrowly circumscribed what counts as an associa-
tion in fact by requiring the prosecution to satisfy certain factors. 229
Factors are appropriate methods by which to guide RICO's scope re-
garding associations in fact, but they should not become rigid require-
ments that foreclose a RICO prosecution that might otherwise be
appropriate. Courts that develop factors for analyzing associations in
fact should approach each case on its own facts in light of the legisla-
tive policies that motivated state RICO statutes in the first place.
These courts should also grant significant deference to local prosecu-
tors as the ultimate enforcers of this powerful tool. The next Part will
respond to critics of state RICO laws and suggest how such laws can be
effectively applied in appropriate circumstances without tinkering
with the broad enterprise definition.
B. Responding to the Critics
In the last five years, criticism of both federal and state RICO
statutes by legal commentators has been particularly intense. Much of
225 See supra text accompanying notes 44-49.
226 One commentator argued that "[w]henever a court embarks upon its interpretive
mission, it should construe statutory language in the light of legislative purpose." Blicken-
sderfer, supra note 118, at 879. Besides the obvious problems in determining "legislative
purpose" from the often contradictory annals of legislative history, such interpretive meth-
odology can easily be used as a pretext imposing additional requirements that the text of
the enterprise definition does not support.
227 See supra part I.B.2.
228 See supra parts mI.D.2, I.D.4.
229 See supra parts HI.D.1, III.D.3.
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the criticism has focused on restricting the broad reach of RICO's def-
initions, especially the open-ended enterprise definition. All of these
critics assume that federal and state RICO statutes should be treated
the same. However, as the suggested amendments might apply to the
purposes and functions of state RICO statutes, these criticisms miss
their mark and should be displaced by more constructive reformation.
1. Specific Arguments for Restricting RICO
Russell D. Leblang, a Boston attorney, has leveled heavy criticism
against the enterprise definitions of state RICO statutes.230 Leblang
first suggests that legislatures amend the enterprise definitions to re-
quire the prosecution to prove that the defendant obtained "substan-
tial income" from the enterprise. 231 He argues that such a
requirement would eliminate the application of RICO against "a Mar-
tin Luther King type of organization, Operation Rescue, and similar
groups whose actions are not motivated by pecuniary gain... [and] it
will prevent prosecution of small scale criminal activity."232
This argument ignores the very purposes of state RICO, which
this Note discussed earlier.238 State RICO should apply to all types of
organizations because the criminal activity RICO is intended to reach
is not restricted to economic gain alone. For example, an informal,
criminal street gang that initiated its members by requiring them to
make "hits" (murders) on other street gangs should be reachable by
RICO. 2 - Many types of criminal activity that state RICO statutes are
better suited to target include crimes that might involve no monetary
issues at all, including murder, assault, arson, and other crimes of vio-
lence. Although RICO can be an extremely effective tool against com-
plex white-collar crime, it should not be judicially restricted to such
application.
As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court recently
held in National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidle 2 35 that, under
the federal RICO statute, an economic purpose need not motivate the
RICO enterprise. 236 In the petitioner's Scheidler brief, the National
Organization for Women argued that the creation of such "non-tex-
tual" requirements finds "no support in the text ... [or] legislative
230 Leblang, supra note 6, at 109-11.
231 Id. at 109-10.
232 Id. at 109.
233 See supra part I.B.2.
234 Oregon's RICO statute, OR. REv. STAT. § 166.715-166.735 (1993), is one of several
state RICO statutes that does not require a defendant to receive pecuniary gain in order to
be guilty of participating in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Ore-
gon also includes homicide as a possible offense constituting a predicate act.
235 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
236 Id. at 801. Though the issue decided in Scheidlerdiffers from Leblang's substantial
income requirement, it is sufficiently analogous that these criticisms apply to both issues.
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history of RICO."23 7 The petitioner also argued that an economic mo-
tive requirement is "vague, uncertain and problematic" and would "in-
vite the weighing of subjective racial, religious, political, psychological
and social motivations that have no place in RICO cases."238 The term
"economic motive" itself is problematic because it remains unclear
how much economic motive would be necessary to satisfy the require-
ment and whether the proof would be the defendant's subjective be-
lief or some codified goal of the RICO enterprise.239 In reality,
groups like Operation Rescue or similar non-profit organizations are
just as capable of being infiltrated by criminal elements and of operat-
ing as criminal enterprises as any for profit organization. In some
cases, these groups can inflict even greater damage by causing physi-
cal injury to victims rather than economic injury.
Finally, it is precisely because federal authorities do not have the
resources to prosecute small-scale criminal activity that legislatures
created state RICO in the first place.2 40 It is true that prosecutors
should bring RICO charges with sensitivity to the types of cases that
are appropriate for a RICO prosecution, but the very fact that certain
criminal activity is small-scale should not itself preclude RICO's appli-
cation. The case examples this Note discussed above241 demonstrate
the threat that pervasive small scale criminal activity can present to
local communities. In many cases, particularly in rural communities,
small-scale organized criminal activity is much more common and in-
flicts much greater injury on its victims than large, well-organized
criminal syndicates like the Mafia or La Cosa Nostra.
Leblang also suggests that the RICO enterprise should contain a
minimum number of individuals because "use of the RICO statute is
inappropriate if only one or two people are involved." 242 It is difficult
to see how some arbitrary numerical minimum would better serve the
purposes of state RICO unless one relies on the erroneous belief that
federal and state RICO should only be directed toward the nebulous
target of organized crime.243 The Scheidler petitioner correctly argued
that because Congress defined enterprise without ambiguity, it avoids
237 Brief for Petitioner at 12-13, National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct.
798 (1994) (No. 92-7780) [hereinafter Scheidler Petitioner's Brief].
238 Id. at 13. For obvious reasons, courts should hesitate to infuse judicially created
ambiguity into an otherwise clear and unambiguous statute.
239 See id. at 38-39.
240 See supra part I.B.2.
241 See supra part I.
242 Leblang, supra note 6, at 110. For some inexplicable reason, Leblang would except
from this restriction "the municipal judge who fixes traffic tickets." This author does not
see the logic in this exception. Why exempt the judge from such a restriction, but not, say,
the single attorney in a large law firm who commits insurance fraud over a period of 10
years?
243 See supra note 19.
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"any need to look for hidden meanings.., or to judicially amend the
terms. ' 244 The state RICO enterprise definitions as they now exist are
clear and unambiguous. Leblang offers no logical reason why the en-
terprise definition should be restricted by an arbitrary number that
bears no relation to the criminal activity that RICO is intended to
reach.245 Enterprise criminality exists in many forms and can be just
as deserving of enhanced criminal penalties if its participant members
are few. 246
One commentator has argued that the liberal construction clause
of the federal RICO statute should be abolished, leading other com-
mentators to suggest the same with regard to state RICOs.2 47 It is true
that the normal approach to criminal statutes is to require strict con-
struction.248 However, even if RICO on the whole should be inter-
preted strictly (an argument that this author neither supports nor
rejects), the enterprise definition in particular should not be subject
to the rule of strict interpretation because the clear and unambiguous
language of the definition in most states exhibits the state legislature's
intention to reach every form of criminal enterprise. 249 The term en-
terprise must remain broad and open-ended in order to facilitate the
intended targets of the state legislatures: all forms of enterprise crimi-
244 Scheidler Petitioner's Brief, supra note 237, at 13.
245 It was discussed above that at least two states, Texas and Kentucky, impose a mini-
mum numerical requirement for proof of an enterprise. See supra note 49 and accompany-
ing text. However, it is important to remember that both of those statutes target particular
forms of criminal activity and do not represent the vast majority of state RICO statutes that
are intended to cover a much broader range of criminal activity. It might well be persua-
sive that when a state intends to target a particular type of criminal activity like street gang
activity, a minimum numerical requirement would be an appropriate method to restrict
the scope of the statute to the targeted criminal activity.
246 See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 440 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. Ct. App.) (four defendants), cert.
denied, (Ga. Mar. 25, 1994); Drewry v. State, 411 S.E.2d 898 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming
the denial of five defendants' demurrers); State v. Huynh, 519 N.W.2d 191 (Minn. 1994)
(one defendant, but at least four other occasional associates); State v. Cheek, 786 P.2d
1305 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (one defendant with six other occasional associates).
247 See Ludwick, supra note 9, at 417; see aLso Leblang, supra note 6, at 111-12 (arguing
that states with liberal construction clauses patterned after the federal statute should abol-
ish them).
248 See Leblang, supra note 6, at 112.
249 The enterprise definition does not exhibit the vague or ambiguous qualities that
normally require a reviewing court to apply the traditional rule of strict construction of
criminal statutes. In fact, state courts that have entertained constitutional challenges to the
state RICO statute for vagueness have upheld the statute. See, e.g., State v. Tocco, 750 P.2d
874 (Ariz. 1988); Chancey v. State, 349 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029
(1987); State v. Walker, 506 N.W.2d 430 (Iowa 1993); State v. Passante, 542 A.2d 952 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1987). But see Commonwealth v. Bobitski, 632 A.2d 1294 (Pa. 1993) (requiring
strict construction).
It is possible that by rejecting the strict construction of the enterprise definition, I
implicitly reject that doctrine as applied to the entire RICO statute. That might be so, but
a discussion of the implications of such reasoning, as interesting as it might be, is beyond
the scope of this Note.
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nality. One commentator has also suggested that "liberal construction
[of RICO] may bolster public confidence in the legal system by mak-
ing the law appear more rational."250 Broad construction should not
be seen as judicial license for unfettered interpretation, but should
grant broad prosecutorial discretion to which the reviewing courts
should defer. There are better methods for restricting the scope of
state RICO statutes than by handcuffing the definition that is most
fundamental to RICO's purpose.
More persuasive suggestions have focused on associations in fact.
One commentator, joining the arguments of others, has argued that
prosecutors who allege an association-in-fact enterprise should be re-
quired to prove elements of both continuity and structure.251 Most of
these critics rely on the Eight Circuit's opinion in United States v. Bled-
sod252 to explain that prosecutors should first be required to prove "a
structure capable of acts beyond the alleged pattern." 253 However,
any requirement of a formal structure for associations in fact would
defy the very definition of associations in fact 254 and undermine the
purpose of some state RCOs to reach every possible criminal enter-
prise. A growing number of state courts allow the enterprise to be
inferred from the pattern of racketeering activity.2 55 If this structural
requirement merely imagines proof of an enterprise capable of commit-
ting acts beyond the alleged pattern, then this requirement does not
restrict the enterprise definition much at all. Either way, this require-
ment does not seem to mandate any amendment to the current enter-
prise definitions in state RICO statutes.
Leblang argues that prosecutors should be required to prove that
the enterprise functioned "as a continuing unit."256 Because many
states intend RICO to reach any and all types of criminal enterprises,
250 Palm, supra note 24, at 181.
251 See Daley, supra note 6, at 411 (arguing that the Florida definition of enterprise
"should be amended to reflect that a showing of continuity is required for this element as
well"). Such an approach originated in a federal court case, United States v. Bledsoe, 674
F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982). For a good discussion of this
case, see Ludwick, supra note 9, at 392; see also Leblang, supra note 6, at 111 (arguing for
requirements of both continuity and structure); Donald Cosmo i1gorio, Ohio's Pattern of
Corrupt Activities Law: Ohio Revised Code Sections 2923.31-.36, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 279
(1991) (arguing for the adoption of a three-prong test patterned after Bledsoe).
252 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1982).
253 Leblang, supra note 6, at 111.
254 As the United States Supreme Court argued in Scheidler, "Congress could easily
have narrowed the sweep of the term 'enterprise' by inserting a single word." National
Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 805 (1994) (referring to United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), which noted that Congress did not include the word
"legitimate").
255 See cases cited and discussion supra part III.D; see also State v. Hill, No. CA-8094,
1990 WL 237485 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (allowing inference of RICO enterprise from the
pattern of racketeering activity).
256 Leblang, supra note 6, at 111.
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however, the appropriate rule, which at least two states have
adopted,257 requires prosecutors to introduce "proof of an on-going
organization, however loose, that is distinct from the commission of
separate criminal acts by an individual."258 Thus, though there is no
formal requirement of structure, there already exists in some states a
continuity requirement of an "on-going organization" that recognizes
the fact that "associates in that organization might come and go."
2 59
State courts have adapted this requirement in different forms, 26 0 and
state courts would likely benefit from its use in evaluating whether an
association in fact exists. As Part HlI.D discussed, associations in fact
are the most difficult types of enterprise to identify because they are
often shadowy and nebulous. It is not unreasonable to expect that
state courts would develop their own tests to provide some consistency
to their interpretation of the enterprise definition. This does not
amount to imposing requirements that are unsupported by the text of
the definition, but rather is a method of analysis that courts use to
guide the interpretation of a complicated statutory term. This meth-
odology can be developed and used by state courts without altering
the textual meaning of the enterprise definition.
2. Practical Suggestions for Restricting State RICO
For those legislatures that desire to restrict the scope of state
RICO statutes, there are two methods that are preferable to tinkering
with the enterprise requirement: (1) adopt rules regarding
prosecutorial discretion; and (2) amend the pattern of racketeering
activity element to restrict the crimes that can qualify as predicate acts.
Leblang offers many ideas for curbing prosecutorial discretion in
RICO charges.26' All of these ideas are based on the prosecutorial
philosophy that state RICO should not be overused lest its punitive
257 See supra part III.D.
258 State v. Cheek, 786 P.2d 1305, 1307 (Or. Ct. App.), reiew denied, 794 P.2d 793 (Or.
1990). The "distinctive" requirement was discussed supra part II1.B. But see State v. Russell,
611 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (requiring the state to prove that "the
group has an identifiable decision making structure and a mechanism for controlling and
directing the group on an ongoing basis").
259 Cheek, 786 P.2d at 1308.
260 See discussion supra part IE.D.
261 One of Leblang's ideas that this author rejects is the creation of a RICO Commis-
sion to make every RICO charge and plea bargain subject to its approval. Leblang, supra
note 6, at 94-96. Such a program would create an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy that
would discourage prosecutors from using RICO except in the most extreme circumstances
(which the U.S. Attorney would probably handle anyway). This would also hurt states with
large rural populations whose prosecutors would have to justify their charging policies to
an agency often in a larger city with an urban population.
A milder and more attractive suggestion would be to require RICO charging approval
from the district attorneys in the counties affected because they are elected individuals to
whom the voters have entrusted the power of discretion. Members of a state commission
would be appointed with no analogous internal sense of accountability.
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force be diluted.2 62 David Frohnmayer, in advocating the Oregon
RICO statute, has argued that "[b]ecause of the broad range of of-
fenses potentially indictable under RICO, and the severity of potential
RICO remedies, prosecutors should choose with care those cases
which they bring under RICO."263 He explained that prosecutors
should "carefully... consider the advantages of simply charging viola-
tion of one of the underlying predicate offenses rather than bringing
a RICO case."264 States would do well to enact advisory guidelines for
prosecutors in an attempt to preserve the sanctity of state RICO's ben-
efit to the criminal justice system.
The U.S. Department ofJustice Guidelines also provide some val-
uable suggestions for guiding prosecutorial discretion. These Guide-
lines were enacted in January of 1981 in response to an increasingly
hostile legal community that was encouraging Congress to amend the
broad RICO statute.2 65 Even though the Guidelines are not binding,
they have provided sufficient guidance to maintain criminal RICO
prosecutions at a steady level.2 66 One Guideline that states could eas-
ily adopt is the submission of a "prosecutive memorandum" and a pro-
posed indictment to the district attorney.267 After submission, the
potential defendant's attorney would have the opportunity to discuss
the RICO memorandum and recommendation.2 68 Such pre-trial dis-
covery rules are simple methods that would dispel some of the mystery
and complexity that currently surround state RICO prosecutions.
Another viable method for restricting RICO's scope is to more
narrowly tailor the types of criminal activity that can constitute predi-
cate acts. Many state RICO statutes include a broad range of applica-
ble crimes, including most felonies and an array of misdemeanors. 269
By restricting the types of crimes to which RICO can apply, a state
262 There is also a concern that local prosecutors overuse state RICO statutes. How-
ever, there are often other systemic safeguards to prevent reckless and unfounded prosecu-
tions regardless of the particular crime charged. These safeguards also deter abuse arising
from changing every state offense into a state RICO charge. Such heightened punishment
is unfair to defendants and avoiding this activity will strengthen state RICO's legitimacy.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, discussing federal RICO, explained that "[o]n the criminal side
this greater breadth is kept under control by the use of prosecutorial discretion by U.S.
attorneys." Rehnquist, supra note 36, at A14. Of course, such guidelines are only effective
if they are not "routinely violated," as one commentator has charged. Look Who's Saving
RICO, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1991, at A10.
263 Frohnmayer et al., supra note 41, at 20.
264 Id. at 21.
265 RAoF & GoLDSTEiN, supra note 36, § 5.01.
266 Id. § 5.02(1). Some federal courts, though, require government compliance with
the RICO guidelines. Id. § 5.02(3).
267 See Coffey, supra note 6, at 1043.
268 See id. at 1047.
269 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-3 (1994) (including crimes "relating to distilling or
making liquors"); see also Dowd, supra note 22, at 163 (explaining that "Florida's RICO
statute is far broader than its federal counterpart, incorporating more crimes").
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legislature can better target those types of enterprise criminality that
present special problems of prosecution in a particular state.270 This
would allow a state to focus on the proliferation of troublesome crimi-
nal acts without restricting the types of criminal enterprise that can
engage in and be a conduit for those acts.
CONCLUSION
State RICO constitutes one of the most powerful and effective
tools state prosecutors can use to combat the forces of organized crim-
inal activity. Most states have constructed broad enterprise definitions
in order to reach all forms of organized criminality, however loose the
association might be. In most states, the development of state court
case law interpreting the state RICO statutes is in its infancy. How-
ever, as state prosecutors bring more charges under the state RICO
statutes, it is inevitable that state cases involving interpretation of this
broad statute will multiply. In light of the purposes and goals that
state legislatures articulated in passing state RICO statutes, courts
should refrain from imposing requirements on or restricting the
scope of the enterprise definition in state RICO.
Jason D. Reichel t
270 The U.S. Department ofJustice proposed a model state RICO statute that includes
the following "enterprise" definition: "'Enterprise' includes any individual, sole proprie-
torship, partnership, corporation, trust, or other legal entity, or any union, association, or
group of persons, associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as
licit enterprises and governmental entities." PROGRAM BiuEF, supra note 8, at 11. This defi-
nition is broader than many state "enterprise" definitions and patterns the federal defini-
tion. See supra part II.
On the other hand, the model RICO statute suggests predicate acts that mostly target
white collar crime with little focus on violent criminal activity. See supra note 8 for the
"nonexhaustive" list. It is surprising that these suggestions do not include rape, child
abuse, and other sexual offenses that often outrank assault and theft on a seriousness scale.
t The author gratefully acknowledges Hoyt Sze for his helpful comments and sugges-
tions, Dan Norris for introducing me to RICO, and my parents, Gary and Bonnie Reichelt,
for their encouragement and support.
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